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Tab A 
SANDVKEN DISTRICT COURT MINUTES OF PSEXiyiKAKY 
HEARING 
in Saadviten on 
2nd November 1992 
T 31/91 
Amrrr 30 
THECOUBT 
Deputy District Judge Joban Alvccr 
KEEPER OF THE MINUTES 
Law Cteic Marianne Lfcjdhalm 
PETITIONER 
Kudu SOFIA Larson, nat rcg. so. 671029-7505, Gnindbogatan 1 E, 
S-811 30 SANDVTKEN; present in person 
Legal reprtiCTtativc: Anita Wallin-Wlberg, Attnrncy-at-law, Bo* 1333, 
S-S01 38 SANDVKEN: present 
RESPONDENT 
MARK Andrew Larson, b. 6.11-65, cf 69 E 600 N Provo, Utah 84606. USA; 
present in person 
Legal representative: Bengt Heasei, Attaraey-aUaw, Box 244, S-811 23 
SANDVKEN; present 
CAUSE 
Dissolution of marriage etru 
Bengt Hennel submitted Mark Larson's application far legal aid. Annrx 31, and 
stated as fellows. Mark was rinmirilrri in Sweden for tbout one year at the age 
of six or seven axxi then between 1985 and 1987. He cannot afford to retain 
counsel in Sweden out of his own podoet and there are special grounds for 
awarding him legal aid. 
Anita Wallia Wiherg, rr^rrtfrg Sofia Lsrson's points of claim, stated u follows* 
Sofia Larson prays the District Court to make a decree absolute of divorce 
between the patties by pazt^odgement and, also on an inrrrincnggy basis* to 
award her sole custody of their daughter Julia and m order Mark Larson to pay 
her, as t"*i"Trn*t>rr- for the daughter, SVK i«075 monthly for the period between 
1st January and 31st May 1991 and SEBL 1.125 monthly ftom 15th January 1992 
and until the child is 18 years old. 
a 
mnintsnnncc claims. For hia own part, alia on in inteiocqtory basis, Mark 
Laraon xa thf first inntancc claimi custody of the daughter. M i l , and pxayi chat 
Sofia Larson be ordered to pay him. as maintenance far meir daughter, SEK 
1,073 monthly from tha day QT xte District Court's temporary order in the matter 
nnril the daughter Is 18 yean old, and to tlu: second lensnexs, in the event of 
Sofia being awarded cu*u*iy of Julia, access to disk daughter in d» USA for two 
coorinucua months ansuatty for the period between 1993 and 1997 asd six wooks 
ffTtfin^ny thenxaftnr. Mark Tarinn confirms Julia's need of miTntpnince at tha 
standard rate of SEK 1,075 mnortily and his own ability tn pay maintenance. In 
the event of custody of (he dangif"* ben* awarded to Sofia Larson. Mark has 
discharged his maintenance obllaadon for die period preceding 15th January 1992. 
Anita Wallin Wibcrg ststed u follows. Sofia Larson contact* tha custody and 
ULtinanacce claims. Julia's need of m**™****™-- ts confirmed, bat So fix Larson 
does cat have the economic resources tn pay maintenance. As regard* the custody 
claim, Sofu Larson consents to Mark Larson bdn* flren the opportunity of 
access to the child, but not tu die a u n t claimed snd uut in the USA. 
Anita WaHin Wiberg atirrri further as foitawi. Sofu Larson met Mark Lanon, 
who ia a member of the Chwch of Jesus Chriat of Later-Day Stints, in 1986, 
while he was living in Sweden. Sofia visited Mark in the USA in 1989 and the 
couple were manied in October 1989. They sealed in the USA and their dmrghmr 
Julia was bom in August 1590. Alter cobbiadna Chrifflnni in &wtad*nt Sofk 
^ ^ ^ H tn IT™**" t h m nnd in J«™**y 1991 pcticooed for t divorce. In July 1991 
Sofia returned to Mark in the USA in a bid to save their marriage, but the 
relationship was iirepaiabls. Sofia considers Mark tempemoental and uncac* 
trolled. He hss a violent temper sod has hit and Wdced Sofia in Julia's presence. 
Softs does not wish to leave Mart alone with JUlla and fears that Mark could 
kidnap Julia and take her to the XJ5A. Mark's merest in Julk lea grown since 
Sulk brought their daughter to Sweden. Between July 1991 and January 1992, 
when Sofia and Julia were living with Mark in the USA, there was a let of 
<junrrefling snd Sofia w u forced to leave the USA without telling Mark in 
sdvince. Summing up, it is Sofia who, ever since Julia waa born, bai been 
mainly responsible for her snd is ben suited to look sftrr her, Jotm custody ti not 
feasible and It is in Julia's best uuercau for Sofia lo be awarded sole custody of 
her. 
Bengt Heunel stated u follows. Sofia Ldt the USA ia November 1990. It was 
agreed that Mark ahould join her and that they ware to celebrate Oniinnai with 
Sofia'* family in Sweden. Sofia's relatives persuaded her to stay on in Sweden. 
and Made w u iioerally dixuwu nut by tier Xamily. Evidoody one of Scfia'a women 
tricada had phoned, aaymg that Mack mrnnried to kidmp Julia, which was a 
compiles fabrication. When Sofia and Julia returned to the USA in tha itimner 
of 1WI. awything want well to besin with, hut in Nowmher 1991 Cbe 
Kclaikiuahip deteriorated and Sofia returned to Sweden without telling Mark first. 
i £ mrj<^o>x3ctwasi January and June 1991, Mark contributed towaria Julia's Upkeep by 
0045 
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1Q%4QG net)* Mark used to have hia own flat, but he is now living with hi* 
grandmother. Mack works in the optica industry and haa plenty of scope for 
working overtime; this entitles him to time off, over and above the tegular two 
weeks1 paid holiday. If Julia cornea to the USA, Mark can work half-time and 
look after her during his leisure. A brother, with a Swedish wife, and three 
married cousins live in the some city, and ao Mark has plenty of help available 
for looking after Julia. While in Sweden, Maxk haa been allowed to me^ t Julia far 
about 10 hours, always in the presence of Sofia and her relatives. Sofia has no 
grounds whatsoever for denying him normal access to their daughter, and with 
Sofia's altitude to the matter of access, ft is Made who is best suited for custody 
of Julia. Mark it aware that a child naeda both its parents and Sofia would be 
given plenty of opportunity for regular access to Julia. If Sofia ia awarded custody 
of their daughter and Mark irms, then, while Julia is still too small to travel on 
her own, Mart will come to Sweden and collect Julia and will then bring her 
back to Sweden. 
Anita Wallin Wiberg stated as fallows. Sofia has not received any financial 
assistance towards Julia's upkeep. On the other hand she has received money 
towards her tnlrphnrm bill and towards the cost of forwarding luggage. As regards 
the risk of kidnapping, Sofia's <-***«« of recovering her daughter if Mark ahould 
keep her in the USA are fairly nan-exiatcaL Sofia ia currently unemployed. She 
previously bad a temporary teaching job and ia now waiting to hear whether she 
has been accepted for a study programme she haa applied for. 
Bengt Hennei stated as fallows. Mark Larson confirms that Sofia Larson is 
unemployed. 
Sofia Larson sratcri as follows. While she was living in the USA, Mark had 
outbursts of tzge and threw things, often without her being able to understand 
why. Mark has struck hnr and occasionally aiso kicked her. They differed on 
many matters, e.g. religion and child education. She returned to the USA brcauv 
she wanted the relationship to work, but it would oat. Mark has never been 
violent to Julia and now that they have met in Sweden things have gone well. 
Sofia doea not know whether the threat of kidnapping was in earnest, but she does 
not trust Made Mark ahould be allowed access to Julia but ahould cot be allowed 
to take her to the USA anal Julia is older. 
Maxk Larson stated as follows. He has always cared about Julia, but distance hai 
made it hard to keep in touch with her. Previously Sofia also prevented him from 
niiTing to Julia ca the phone. The relatincahip between himself and Sofia broke 
down and Sofia was depressed, felt bad and would not speak co her friends or 
even meet them. There wme two occasions when he "struck" Sofia. One of them 
was a purely reflex movement against Sofia's leg, and the second rime was a blow 
which struck her on the cheek when she 'exploded" in the car. Sofia can not have 
been injured on either of tfi-r* occasions. He has never klrirad her and never 
jwn anything it her or in such a way that there was a risk of her being struck. 
^ ^ ^ A Z T ^ S K ? ' 8 la^c °f kidnapping is quite groundless. On the contrary, he has told her 
nn/i/i 
la 
thai he would never go off with Julia the way Sofia did when she took Julia and 
left the USA without celling him fiisc Sofia and Julia have a good relationship 
and he wants it to continue. If he is awarded cuitody, folk will be allowea to 
visit Sofia in Sweden. 
Anita Wallin Wibcrg stated a* follows. Sofia Larson consents to Mark Larson 
hrrrg allowed access to Julia, three times a year for one week at a time. Access 
may be exercised in Sofia'i home or in some other place on which the parties can 
agree, but not in the USA. 
Anita Wallin Wtberg cMrnrri remuneration in accordance with an expense 
if mum i Annex 31. suhmiucd. 
The proceedings, having hated from 11 a.m. to 12.23 p.m., were declared closed 
with the announcement (hat a part-judgement and order would be made by being 
made available in the District Conn Office on 13th November 1992 at 2 p.m. 
Retiring to chambers, the District Court made a part-judgement ana the fallowing 
ORDER (to be issued on 13th November 1992 at 2 p.nx.). 
Until such time as these matters have been detenninad by a judicial decision, 
having force of law or by a decision to the contrary, the Districtr Court orders 
u follows. 
1. Cnimriy of TTTLIA Snfi*. nar. reg. vn. 900HlKi92Sf dull cooitae to be 
vcased in Sofia Larson . sa ordered by the District Court in its temporary 
order ot 10& May 1991. 
2< The District Court finds no cause to amend its temporary order of lOthMay 
1991 in die matter of TmHwngnra^  which order shall accordingly remain in 
force. 
3. Mark Larson shall be ****** to accen to the daughter. Julia, for one 
month in the year, at a time to be agreed on in detail between the parties. 
Anita Wallin Wiberg is awarded an advance payment of SEX 9,850 under the 
Legal Aid Act. In view at the rules coxEerning payment of legal aid charges, this 
entire " r o w shall be disbursed out of public fundi. 
0043 
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My ippal against this order shall bfi m*k separately, by limited appeal, not 
liter thin 4th December 1992. 
Date u above, 
(Signature:) 
Marianne Liadhdm 
Recent read and approved/(Initials) 
(Stamp:) 
SANDVKEN DISTRICT COURT 
For a txua copy, 
(Signature) 
nr\Ao 
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THE COURT OF APPEAL 
FOR SOUTHERN NORRLAND 
REODRD OP HEAHJNG 
in Sundivsil on 
latii.DcQBmber 1992 
S3 8 
Annex: 1C 
6 1180/92 
THE COURT 
Chiuttr Berg, Appellate Court Judge 
Gotta Grdberg, Appellate Court Judge Referee 
Kxtttxna Brafieberg, Acting Appellate Court Judge 
KEEPER OF THE MINUTES 
The Referee 
VARIOUSLY APPELLANT AMD OPPONENT (not present) 
Karia SOFIA, Lmrm, net. rcg. no. 671029-75Q5»' Plangataa 4 C, 
S-*ll 29 SANDVTKEN 
Legal representative and counsel under &e Legal Aid Act: Anita Wallin Wiberg, 
AttomeyHt-Uw, Box 1333. S-801 38 QAVLE 
VARIOUSLY APPELLANT AND OPPONENT (sot present) 
MASK Andrew fanon, b. 6.11.65, citizen of the United States of America, 69 
E 600 N Proro, Utah 84606, USA 
Legal rcareaexzative and. comae! under the Legal Aid Act: Bengt HexmeL 
Attoxsey-at-iaw, Box 244. S-311 23 SANDVKEN 
CAUSE 
Temporary order concerning right of access to child etc. 
DECTSTON CUNTES1HD 
Made by the Sandviken District Court on 13th November 1992 in case no. T 
33#1. 
The case being presented by Trainee Deputy Judge Sten Ekstrand, the Court at 
Appeal noted as follows. 
In her application of 30th January 1991 far a writ of tnmmrnn against Mark 
Larson. Sofia Lartoa prayed, the District Court TQ make a dcu.ee ahaotatr of 
divorce between them and, also on an interlocutory basia. to award her custody 
_ of their child JULIA Sofia, tax. rcg. no. 900*13-3929, and to order MetkLanon 
y SEX. 1,078 nuiuieuaace monthly for dscir daughter, with «ffitc* from 38th 
EXHI! IIT9 
'038 
4 
January 1991 and until the child ia 18 yean old*, accrued amounts to be paid 
immediately and subsequent amouni* in advance of each calendar mrmrft 
Mark Larson hiving been served with the summons application and a special 
injunction but nothing having been heard from lxim thereafter, die District Court, 
on IQQk May 1991 and until such tune a* these cucsaana were decided by a 
judgement having three of law or pending decision to the contrary, the District 
Court made an order in «*™Hnrir» with Sofia. Larson's poims of claim ia the 
migpra of custody and maintenance, though without indicating tint accrued 
amnuntt of maintenance vert to be paid immediately. 
At a preliminary hearing on 2nd November 1992, Sofia Larson prayed the District 
Court to make a decree absolute of divorce between the parties by part-judgement 
and. also, on in interlocutory bails, m award her sole custody of their ^"eft*^ 
Julia and to order Mark Larson to pay her, as maintenance for their daughter, 
SEK 1,075 monthly far the period between 1st January and 31at May 1991 
inclusive, and SEJC 1,125 monthly as from 15* January 1992 and until the child 
is 18 years old. Mark Larson consented to the divurca claim but contested cho 
custody and ^ imn-naTire clsixns. He confirms SEK 1,075 per month ai reasonable 
maintenance but claimed chat he had discharged his maintenance obligation fcr the 
period preceding 12th January 1992. For his own part, also on an interlocutory 
basis, he claimed, in the first instance, sole custody of the dstightrr and 
maintenance for her. In the second instance, in the event of Sofia Larson being 
awarded custody of the daughter, Mark Larson also on an interlocutory basis, 
prayed that he be awarded right of access to the daughter for mo continuous 
months per annum between 1993 and 1997 and for six weeks per annum 
thereafter* custody to be exercised in the USA. Sofia Larson contested Mark 
Larson11 custody and maintenance claims. As regards the custody claim. Sofia 
Larson consented to Mark Larson being entitled to access to the child three times 
annually for one week at a time, the access to be exercised in her home or in 
some other place on which the pardes were able to agree, but not in the USA. 
On 13th November 1992, pending the determination of these maocn by a 
jnrf^ i !'inii.^iiiK fnii-w nf law or drriiinn fn rhr rnntrary, the District Court 
ordered as follow*: 
(1) Custody of the daughter of the parties, Julia, shall continue, ss ordered by 
the District Court m its temporary aider of 10th May 1991, to be vested in 
Sofia ljuson. 
(2) The District Court finds no cause to amend its temporary order of 10th May 
1991 in the ™»"w of m*inrcnaxice* which order shall accordingly remain In 
force. 
(3) Mark Larson shall be entitled to access to the daughter, Julia, for one 
5 
In its pan-judgment of 13th November 1992, the Diitric: Coun made a decree 
absolute of divorce between the parties. 
Sofia. Tarmn aod Mad: Linen have filed separate appeal against the Diuriet 
Coon's order of 13th November 1992, and in doing so presented the following 
points of claim. 
Sofia Larson has prayed the Coozt of Appeal to set Mark Lanon's right of 
temporary access to their daughter Julia at one week during the tummn term, one 
w c A dnrfrig rfcy frpnrg ***** T*™ ™™ **•*»> in tfe^ auirrmer mrtnfhi. Shm faaS farther 
atipulaad that the access shall take place in her home or in another place in 
Sweden which ihs may inrHnam, that access may not be exercised during the 
ChriHtmas and New Year holiday and cn.no occasion in the USA, and that the 
time of access shall be decided two weeks in advance of each occasion, with 
Made Lsraon notifying bar of his wishes. 
Mark Larson has prayed the Court of Appeal to award him right of temporary 
acceaa to the ***"ght?r of the panics, Julia, in the USA for a period of two 
continuous tnonrhs annually, subject to his being obliged, not less than one month 
before the time when he intends access to begin, to notify Sofia Larson according-
ly, and also to set his temporary miTTtnflnrr! obligation to Sofia Larson at SEK 
1,075 monthly as from 14th January 1992, payable in advance of each ralgndar 
month. 
Sofia Larson and Mark Larson have contested each other's amendment claims. 
The Court of Appeal makes the following 
FINAL ORDER 
In view of the child's age and other circumstances, it is appropriate that Mark 
Larson's rights of temporary access to the daughter. Julia, should be defined as 
referring to access in Swtden and should mainly be arranged in accordance with 
Sofia Larson's petition to Coun of Appeal. 
In the rnimrr of mainronanr* it follow* from the provisions of Chap. 7, Section 
LS of the Code of Parenttood and Guardianship that a temporary mtinrwianfie 
order can at any time be f-rmW by xhe Coun aa regards the ongoing mainten-
ance obligation, whereas reappraisal of such an order, with retroactive effect, 
shall not T^ V* place |1f>t+i the ^ ^ haj been determined. Thus the decision 
contested shall be deemed to comprise Mart Larson's obligation, for the period 
from 13th November 1992 until the child is 13 years old, to pay SHE 1,078 
jpmrnT+rump* joonthly for the daughter in advance of each ralrnri*r month. The 
Court of Appeal find* no came for •mfmrling cbs order tins* m»d*. 
z^'-^.Wlth reference to the above, the Caurt of Appeal amends the contested decision 
;V x^naofar aa ths Court of Appeal, pending the detaiminjojon of the matter by judicial 
0036 
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decision or an order having gained force of law, or pending decision to tha 
contrary, order* that Mark Larson ihall have a right of accen to the daughftn- of 
the parties, Julia Sofia, nat. reg, no. 900813-3929, far one week between the 
mnnrhi of January and May, two wqcKi between the mrmrbg of June and August 
and one week bexcr* the nrnirfh^  of September and December, though not during 
the Qiriumit or New Year holiday, Accetc may only be exetciced in Sweden, 
at a place designated by Sofia T anion and at the exact times which, Mark Larson 
having apprised Sofia Larson of hb preferences, haw been decided two weeks in 
advance of every orcMinn 
For services rendered in the Court of Appeal proceedings, the Court of Appeal 
awards Anita Wailin Wberg SEK 1.780 and Bengt Kennel SEK 2,670 as 
remuneration under the Legal Aid AnL 
INSTRUCTIONS FDR APPEAL 
Any appeal against the awards of remuneration to Anita Wallia WJberg and Bengt 
Hcnnri ihall be made, by limited appeal, not later than Tuesday, 9th February 
1993. 
Under Chap. 2Q, Section 12(3) of the Code of Parenthood and Guardianship, no 
appeal can be made against the Conn of Appeal's decision on other respects. For 
instructions concerning prosecution of appeal proceedings, see enclosure. 
(Signature:) 
Keeper of the Mioztes 
Record read and approved 12.1.1993/ (Initiate) 
Given 12m January 1993 
(Steam;) 
COURT OF APPEAL FOR 
SOUTHERN NOHRLAND 
For a true copy, 
(Signoturz) 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTj v "''; ; ; f; \ Z- C 3 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVLSlCN." ;CV Gr VjTAiS 
In the matter of: 
JULIA LARSON, 
A minor child. 
KARIN SOFIA OHLANDER, flea 
KARIN SOFIA LARSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MARK ANDREW LARSON, 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ak 
Case No. 94-CV-87J 
ORDER AND JTUDGMENT 
This action came before the court, the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Senior 
United States District Judge, presiding, on Friday, April 21, 1995, at 9:30 a.m., for a nonjury 
trial. The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, based upon 
the record and pursuant to this court's jurisdiction under article III, section 2 of the United 
States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 11603 and the Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980 (the Hague 
Convention ), and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
Case No. 94-CV-87J 
1. The Petitioner is DENIED leave to withdraw her petition under the 
Hague Convention, and Petitioner's motion to dismiss her Hague Convention petition is 
DENIED. 
2. The Application for Withdrawal of Counsel for Petitioner is DENIED. 
3. The Petitioner's petition under the Hague Convention, filed in these 
proceedings, is DENIED on the merits. 
4. The minor child, Julia Sofia Larson, is to be returned to the State of 
Utah, so that the courts of the child's place of habitual residence, namely, Utah County, Utah, 
United States of America, may determine the issue of custody. The Petitioner and Respondent 
are hereby ordered to take all steps necessary to cause the return of the minor child, Julia Sofia 
Larson, to the State of Utah so that a Utah state court can determine the issue of custody and 
related matters. Once Julia Sofia Larson is returned to the State of Utah, no person shall 
remove her from the State of Utah without an express written order of this court or of the state 
court in Utah County, Utah, where the matter of custody is presently pending. 
5. This court respectfully requests the assistance of the Contracting States 
in recognizing and enforcing this court's ruling under the Hague Convention. 
6. The court determines that this Order and Judgment fully resolves the 
Petitioner's Hague Convention claims. The court expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay in entering this order as a final, appealable judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(b), and directs that this Order and Judgment be so entered. 
2 
Case No. 94-CV-87J 
7. The Respondent's claims for an award and judgment of attorney fees and 
other expenses incurred in these proceedings are hereby reserved. 
8. Except as modified by this Order and Judgment, the court's Order of 
August 15, 1994, shall remain in full force and effect. 
9. This Order and Judgment shall remain in full force and effect pending 
any appeal thereof unless stayed by further order of this court or the court of appeals. 
MADE AND ENTERED this \3~ day of June, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
BRUCE'S. JENKIN 
SENIOR UNITED^STA' DISTRICT JUDGE 
I hereby catty flat tteamnddocumertbataM 
and correct oofyo*t»ortg**OOlitotf*oao». 
ATTEST: MARKU8&2MUai 
CtafcUt&GMfctCHrt 
OatK 
0247 
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SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
CTTJDGM2N? C a s e n o . 
4S2S-1995 
delivered in Stockholm on Decerrber 2C , 1995 
COMPLAINANT 
Sofia Ohlander, personal identification no. S71C29-
7505, of Plangatan 6 C, 311 39 Sandvi:<en 
Representative and counsel under the Legal Aid Act: 
Anita Tallin Wiberg, Attorney-a::-lav, Advokatfirman 
Hahne & Co, Box 1333, 801 33 G^vie 
OWQSZTE PARTY 
Mark Larson, date of birth November 5, 1965, of 636 
South S50 East, Orera, Utah 84C5S, USA 
Representative and counsel under the Legal Aid Act: 
Fredric Renstron, Attorr.ey-at-lav, 3irger Jarlsgatan 
13, 
111 45 Stockholm 
APPEAL AGAINST A COURT DECISION 
Judgment delivered by Sundsvail Administrative Court 
of Appeal on August 25, 1995 in case no. 2513-1995 
•Annex) 
MATTER 
Return of a child pursuant to the Act (1989:14) 
concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Decisions relating to Custody etc. and y 
concerning the Return of Children. 
"IQ-JAH-98 ONS 0 8 : 0 0 RP^RT CROFTS ftB FAXNR. 062AL&68 S . i » , 4 U U U 4 
2 
DEMANDS ETC • 
Sofia Chlcuidei. demands that the Supreme 
Administrative Court alter the judgment c£ the 
Administrative Court of Appeal, dismissing Hark 
Larson'3 suit and withdrawing that judgment• she 
also demands chat the Supreme Administrative Court 
shall obtain information/a report from the social 
welfare committee in'Sur.dsvall about Julia's present 
home conditions and that this report ehculd be 
completed with a report from the Children's and 
Adolescents' Psychiatric Clinic for the purpose of 
establishing how the child has adjusted to Sweden -
and whether returning her would entail serious risks 
co her mental or physical health. In support: of her 
suit in respect of the return of Julia, Sofia 
Chlander has adduced the following. After Ir^er birth 
Julia has resided in Sweden ever since November/ 
195 0, with the exception of seven months during 1991 
and two months at the turn of 1953/1994. ;&*rk Larson 
tcck the law into his own hand3 when he zetched * 
Julia in November, 1?93. In 1992 and 1993 Mark -
Larson took part in the Swedish custody proceedings, 
thus accepting Swedish jurisdiction. In view of 
Sofia 6hlanderls intension of remaining in Sweden 
with Julia and the length of time that Julia has 
spent in Sweden, her adjustment tc this country and 
Hark Larscn's passivity, it must be concluded that 
in February, 13S4 Julia's habitual residence was 
Sandviken. 
Mark Larson contests the granting of the appeal and 
the demand that the Supreme Administrative Court 
arrange for further investigation in the case. In 
support cf his suit he has adduced the following, he 
has never accepted that Julia should live in Sweden. 
nor that Sofia inlander should have custody of her. 
Julia was residing m the USA in January/February, 
1994 when Sofia Ohiander unlawfully abducted h*r. 
Subsequently, Sofia Ohlander has prevented all 
contacts between him and Julia. 
In its decision of August 30, 1995 the Supreme 
Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of 
the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal 
with regard to the return cf Julia. 
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REASONS TOR THB SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT'S 
DECISION 
The evidence in the case has established the 
following facts. Mark Larson and Sofia Ohlander were 
riarried en October 27, 198S in the USA and their 
daughter Julia was born there en August 13. 1990, 
The family went to Sweden in November, 199 Q, after 
which Mark Larson returned to the USA alone in the 
beginning of January, 1591. That same .month Sofia 
Ohlander filed a petition for divorce and sole 
custody of Julia at Sandviken District Court. In 
May, 1S91 she was awarded temporary custody of her 
daughter. In June. 1591 she went to the USA with 
Julia, but returned to Sweden in January, 19 92/ on 
which occasion she took her daughter with her 
without Mark Larson's consent. When the qualifying 
period for the divorce e^^pired, Sofia Ohlander 
proceeded with her divorce suit. In November, 1992 
verbal proceedings were held in the divorce case, as 
a result of which Sofia Ohlander was awarded 
continued temporary custody of her daughter ^r.d Mark 
Larson was granted visiting rights. In May, 1993 
•Eark Larson paid a short visit to Sweden. The couple 
were divorced the same year. In November, 1993 Mark 
and his new wife visited Sweden, <>ir+d subsequently 
took Julia to the USA without Sofia Ohlander's 
consent. In January, 1594 Sofia Chlander went to th« 
USA. Under an ex parte order she was provisionally 
awarded custody of Julia without the right to leave 
the USA. Kowevor# on February 2, 1SS4 she took Julia 
with her to Sweden, where they have lived «ver 
since. On January 27, 1595 Kark Larson filed a 
petition with the Gaviebory County Administrative 
Court for the return of Julia to the USA under the 
Act (1939:14) concerning the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Decisions relating to Custody 
etc. and concerning the P.eturr. of Children (the 
Enforcement Act} . 
The provisions cf the Enforcement Act concerning the 
return of children are based on the Convention 
adopted by the Hague Conference in 1950 on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague 
Convention). A general objective of the Convention 
is to protect children against the harmful effects 
b. U4 
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of being uprooted fror. their familiar <anvironment. 
For thi3 purpose the Convention includes provisions 
naking it possible for a child who has been 
unlawfully abduct ad from one State Party to another 
to be speedily returned cc the former 3c as to 
restore the status quo. The Convention has bean 
incorporated into Swedish law insofar as provisions 
intended to reproduce the provisions of th* 
Convention have been included in the Enforcement 
Act. The section that is most relevant to the case 
is section 11 of the Enforcement Act, which 
corresponds to Articles 3 and 12, paragraph 1 of Che 
Hague Convention. As will be explained in greater 
detail below, the main issue in this case is whether 
the abduction of Julia on February 2, 1994 from the 
USA to Sweden was unlawful within the meaning cf the 
above section. 
Pursuant to section 11, subsection 1 cf the 
Enforcement Act, a chile who has unlawfully been 
brought to this country, or who is unlawfully held 
in custody here, shall upon demand be returned to 
the person froa whom the child is biting withheld if 
the child resided in a State Party immediately pr-ior 
to the abduction cr holding in custody. Oncer 
section 11, subsection 2. an abduction or holding in 
custody is unlawful if it conflicts with the 
guardian's or ancchcx person's right to the custody 
of the child in the state where the child resided 
immediately prior to the abduction cr holding in 
custody, provided that this right was exercised at 
the time when the child was abducted or held in 
custody, or would have been exercised if the 
abduction or holding in custody had not taken place. 
Under the Act the question o£ who was the child's 
guardian at the time of the abduction and the 
question of whether the abduction was unlawful is to 
be decided in accordance with the law in the 5Ut« 
in which the child resided at the tima of the 
abduction (section 11, subsection 2 and the special 
statement of reasons on this section in Gov. Bill 
1933/89:8, p. 4C; see also the provisions of 
sections 14 and 23, subsection 1 of the Act). 
Another consequence of these provisions is that the 
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abduction of a child from another stale tc Sweden is 
not unlawful within the meaning of the Act if the 
child resided in Sweden immediately prior to the 
abducticn. The meaning of the tern; residence is thus 
crucial to the application of the provisions of the 
Snforca-^ aenc Act that relate to the return of a 
child. 
A Swedish court deciding on a petition to return a 
child from Sweden to another country must make an 
independent decision on the residence of the child 
at the tirr.e to which section 11. subsection 2 of the. 
Enforcement Act is applicable. The terr. residence is 
net defined in the Enforcement Act. In the 
legislative history of the Act (Gcv. 3ili 1933/59:8, 
pp. 36 and 40) reference was rsade to the 
pronouncements on residence made in connection with 
the incorporation in 1973 of this term in chapter 7, 
section 2 of the Act (1904:26 s. 1) on Certain 
Matters of International Law concerning Carriage and 
Guardianship. (The pronouncements are contained in 
Gov. Bill 1973:153. ^T>. 73). This definition and the 
pronouncements in the Sill cited above formed the 
basis of the definition of the tern residence 
applied in subsequent Swedish legislation and in 
case law on international family law and related 
fields (sec, for example, Gov. Bills 1932/83:38, pp. 
22 ff. ana ISS4/SS:124, p. 40, and NCA (New 
Juridical Archives] 1977, p. 706, 1383, p. 359 and 
1937, p. 600). 
Thus, although the legislative histcry cf the 
Enforcement Act refers to the need, in connection 
with the application of the provisions of the Act 
that relate to the return of a child, to tak* into 
account the definition of the term residence used in 
other national legislation, it nust nevertheless be 
borne in irind that the Enforcement Act is ar* Act 
governed by the provisions of o-n. international 
convention. In interpreting this concept it is 
therefore appropriate tc take particular notice of 
the terminology ^r.d purpose of the Hague Convention. 
The expression '• residence7 in the Enforcement Act 
corresponds to the expression "h&bitual residence" 
or "residence habituelle* in the Hague Convention. 
•-JCC 6 0 1 
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This concept has long been well-established within 
the framework on the Hague Conference, and it is 
used in several cf the conventions adopted by the 
Conference. These conventions do not contain an 
explicit definition of the concept, but according to 
the references in the relevant literature the term 
relates primarily to the. actual circumstances (see, 
inter alia, the summary in SOU {Gov. Official 
Reports) 1976:39, pp. 119-122)- 3asicaily, an all-
round appraisal must be made of such verifiable 
circumstances as the length .of the st3y and social 
attachments *nd other circumstances of a personal cr 
professional nature that indicate a lasting 
connection with one country or the other. The 
individual's intention whether or not to stay in the 
country of residence can also be taken into account. 
but the current view appears to be that, as a rule, 
no great importance should be attached to subjective 
factors. In the case of a child who is not old 
enough to make it possible to consider his or her 
intentions regarding the future, other circumstances 
- in particular, the residence of the guardian, and 
the horse and social conditions - nust obviously be 
decisive. The question has been formulated in terms 
of where the child's "effective life center" is (cf. 
SCC 1976:39, p. 120 and Gov. Bill 1534/35:24, p. 
42) . A point that should always be considered when 
interpreting the tenr, "habitual residence'1, as well 
as the Swedish concept of rasidence, i* that the 
purpose of the rules containing the term should be 
taken into account, and that interpretations may 
therefore differ depending on the context. 
A special issue as regards the residence of small 
children is what rules to apply in cases where the 
parents have joint custody of the child and the 
child is moved from one country to another against 
the will of one of th^ guardians. It. hes been 
asserted on various occasions that such changes of 
residence should not result in the child acquiring a 
new residence (see, for example, the references 
quoted by 3cgdan in Tidskrift for Juridiska 
Foreningen i Finland 19 32, p. 118, note 38. and NJA 
1395, p. 241). However, the sphere of application of 
this principle is not clear (cf. 3ogdan, ibid,. 
b\U/ 
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118-112, ?4Lssan, Svensk rlttspraocis i 
international faic.il je- och arvsratt, p-p. 104-103 
and NJA 1974, p. 330 and p. 529 I and II) . With 
particular reference to the Enforcement Act and the 
Hague Convention on which it is based, it should be 
taken into account chat one general objective, as 
has already been mentioned, is to protect children 
against the harmful effaces of being uprooted from 
their familiar environment, and that one of the 
functions cf the term residence for the purposes of 
the Act, like "habitual residence" in the 
Convention, is to specify the kind of connection 
with a country that giv« the right to protection 
under the Act and the Convention, respectively. It 
is not consistent with this objective for an 
abduction against the will of one of the child's 
guardians to be instrumental in changing the child's 
residence- On the ether hand, it does not seem 
entirely consistent vith that objective to regard 
the circumstances cf the abduction as a permanent 
obstacle to the establishment of a new residence. If 
the child has been in the new country for such a 
length of time and under such conditions that it has 
acquired a ccrnfrr.ior. with the country of the kind 
referred to in the provisions, there should be no 
cbstacle to considering that it has acquired a new 
residence. Particular note should be taken in this 
connection of the fact that under the provisions of 
section 12 of the Enforcement Act, as well as 
Article 12 cf the Convention, the return of a child 
that has been unlawfully abducted may be refused 
where, at the time of the submission of an 
application for the child's return, at least one 
year has passed from the time of abduction and the 
child has settled dovr. in its new environment, 
A matter that must be resolved in this case is 
whether the abduction of Julia from the USP. to 
Sweden in February, 19 34 was unlawful within the 
•ir.ear.ing of tha Enforcement Act. From the abov^ 
remarks it is clear that the abduction cannot be 
regarded as unlawful if Julia's residence at the 
time of the abduction was Sweden* Che evidence shews 
that Julia arrived in Sweden together with her 
mother Sofia Ohlander in January, 1992 and that she 
subsequently lived with her mother in Sandviken up 
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until November. 19S3, when Marx. Larson tock her to 
the USA without her mother's consent. Nor is there 
any doubt that Sofia Chlander acquired Swedish 
residence after her arrival in Sweden. The 
circumstances related above and the other 
information that has been supplied about Julia's 
stay with her mother and her adjustment to 
conditions in Sandviken also clearly indicate that 
she had acquired Swedish residence some time prior 
to her abduction to the USA in November, 1993, 
However, in conformity with the acovs reasoning, the 
circumstances in which Julia was taken back to 
Sw<ad^r. in January, 1392 should also be taken into 
account in an assessment of her residential status. 
The investigation supports Mark Larson's claim that 
the abduction tock place against his will. However, 
he did not file a petition for the return of the 
child following the abduction. Considering this 
fact, the circumstances in connection with the 
abduction in January, 1SS2 should not. on expiry of 
the tveive-menth period referred to in both the 
Enforcement Act and the Convention, prevent the • 
child from acquiring residence in Sweden. In view of 
the above account of Julia's stay in Sweden and her 
adjustment to Swedish conditions, the Supreme 
Administrative Ccurt finds that she must be 
considered to have acquired Swedish residence some 
time before November, 1993, when she was tak«& back 
tc the USA by Mark Larson. The subsequent events -
Julia*s abduction to the USA and her stay tr.ere 
lasting over :wo months • cannot once again have 
changed r^z: residential status. Consequently, 
pursuant to section 11, subsection 2 of the 
Enforcement Act, she must be deemed still to have 
had Swedish residence at the time of the abduction 
from the USA in February, 19S4 that is at issue in 
this case. 
The abduction in February, 1S9 4 was therefore not 
unlawful within the meaning of section 11, 
subsection 2 of the Enforcement Act. Consequently, 
the provisions of the Enforcement Act offer no 
possibility of returning Julia to the USA. Sofia 
Ohlander's main suit shall therefore be granted. 
J J
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In view of this ruling, no measures arcs necessary 
with regard to Sofia Chlar.der's demand for further 
investigation in respect of Julia. ; 
The matter of the parties' legal coses remains to be 
settled. Sofia Shlander's suit implicitly includes a 
demand that she be released from the obligation to 
pay Mark Larson's legal costs in the Lower courts. 
This rratter must be decided in accordance with the 
provisions of section 21 of the Snforcement Act and 
chapter 21, section 13, subsection 1 of the Code on 
Parents, Children and Guardians. Under those 
provisions the court may, where this- is deemed 
reasonable, order a party to pay the other party's 
legal costs. Cn the basis of an overall assessment 
cf the case the Supreme Administrative Court finds 
that there is no reasonable cause for either cf the 
parties to be obliged to pay the other party's legal 
costs. Shis applies to the parties' legal costs both 
in the lower courts and in the Supreme 
Administrative Court. Therefore, Sofia inlander's 
suit shall also be granted in this regard. 
DECISION OF THS SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
The Supreme Administrative Court reverses the 
judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal and 
upholds the judgment of the County Administrative 
Court in the matter of the return cf the child. 
Reversing the judgment of the Administrative Court 
of Appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court releases 
Sofia Ohlander from the obligation to pay Mark 
Larson's legal costs in the lower court3. 
The Supreme Administrative Court rules that 
remuneration shall be paid under the Legal Aid Act 
in the amount of 16 213 kronor tc Anita Wallin 
wiberg, Attorr.ey-at-law, fsr her work as counsel for 
Sofia Ohlander and in the amount of 12 4C2 kronor to 
Fredric Renstrom, Atzcmey-ac-law, for his work as 
counsel for Mark Larscn. Neither party shall be 
obliged to pay the other party's legal costs in the 
Supreme Administrativ« Court. 
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3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK ANDREW LARSON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KARIN SOFIA LARSON, aka ] 
KARIN SOFIA OHLANDER, ) 
Defendant. ] 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I NUNC PRO TUNC 
> Civil No. 944402943 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on October 18, 1996, 
Plaintiff being present and represented by his attorney, Brian C. 
Harrison, and the Defendant being represented by her attorney, 
Daniel Bertch, and the parties' minor child being represented by 
the Guardian Ad Litem, Lorie Fowlke. The Court, having considered 
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the argument of counsel and having reviewed the file and being 
fully advised in the premises, hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Mark Andrew Larson ("Mark") is a U.S. citizen 
and Defendant Karin Sofia Ohlander ("Sofia") is a citizen of 
Sweden. The parties were married on October 27, 1989/ in South 
Jordan, Utah, and established their marital home in Utah County, 
Utah. Thereafter Sofia began the immigration process and became a 
permanent resident of the United States. 
2. Plaintiff is presently a resident of Utah County, Utah, 
and has been for more than three (3) months immediately prior to 
the commencement of this action. 
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
parties making the continuation of the marriage impossible. 
4. There has been one (1) child born as issue of this 
marriage, to wit: Julia Sofia Larson ("Julia"), born August 13, 
1990, in Provo, Utah. 
5. Mark should be awarded the care, custody and control of 
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said minor child subject to Sofia's reasonable rights of 
visitation, 
6. Neither party should be awarded alimony from the other. 
7. Sofia should be required to pay child support to Mark 
according to the child support schedules adopted in the State of 
Utah. 
8. The present distribution of personal property of the 
parties should be confirmed. 
9. Each party should be ordered to assume and pay their own 
debts incurred during the marriage and since the separation. 
10. Plaintiff should be granted a Decree of Divorce, Nunc Pro 
Tunc, effective October 21, 1993. 
11. At the end of 1990 the parties went on vacation with 
their child to Sweden to visit Sofia's family for Christmas, with 
the intent to return to their home in Utah in January 1991. At the 
end of the visit, Sofia decided to remain in Sweden and went into 
hiding with the child, refusing to tell Mark where she and the 
child were or to allow the child to return home with Mark to Utah. 
Mark had to return to Utah by himself in mid-January 1991. 
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12. Sofia commenced a divorce and custody action in Sweden on 
January 30, 1991. 
13. By means of phone calls over the next few months, Mark 
persuaded Sofia to return with their child to their home in Utah, 
which she did on June 3, 1991. Sofia assured Mark that she 
considered their reconciliation to be complete and unconditional, 
and that she was having her lawyer dismiss her Swedish divorce and 
custody action, in which she had obtained a default temporary 
custody order in her favor. Mark believed and relied upon Sofia's 
assurances. 
14. The parties and their child lived together as a family in 
Utah until January 13, 1992, upon which date Sofia abandoned Mark 
without warning and moved to Sweden, taking their minor child with 
her without Mark's foreknowledge or consent and directly against 
his will. 
15. Sofia then petitioned for the divorce and custody matters 
in the action she had filed in Sweden in 1991 to be finalized, 
which action she had not dismissed as she had led Mark to believe. 
16. Mark inquired of several attorneys, as well as a consular 
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officer at the United States Embassy in Sweden, regarding his legal 
options, but he was not informed about his rights under the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(1980), an international treaty requiring that wrongfully abducted 
children be returned promptly to their country of habitual 
residence. 
17. Mark attempted to negotiate a resolution with Sofia 
through their Swedish attorneys, but Sofia demanded sole custody of 
Julia and insisted that any visitation between Mark and Julia must 
take place in Sweden under her personal supervision. 
18. Mark continually attempted to maintain contact with his 
daughter, but Sofia allowed only very restricted contact, and for 
the 3 month period, from February 7 to May 13, 1992, she cut off 
all contact between Mark and Julia. 
19. In October 1992 Mark traveled to Sweden to try to see his 
daughter. He spent 2 weeks there, during which time Sofia allowed 
him to see Julia for a total of less than 14 hours, and only inside 
her apartment under her personal supervision. 
20. Mark again traveled to Sweden in May 1993. Despite a 
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Swedish temporary visitation order in Sofia's Swedish divorce case 
purporting to grant Mark 4 full weeks per year of unsupervised 
visitation with his daughter, Sofia only allowed Mark to see Julia 
during specified daytime hours on seven consecutive days, under her 
constant personal supervision. 
21. After further investigation regarding his legal rights, 
Mark came to believe that the Swedish court did not have proper 
jurisdiction over the divorce or custody matters and that the 
proper forum for these matters was Utah, so he filed for divorce 
and custody in this Court in June 1993 (Case No. 934401196) . A 
decree of divorce between the parties was entered by this Court on 
October 21, 1993, in which the issue of custody was reserved. 
22. After entry of that divorce decree, Mark remarried. 
However, that decree was subsequently vacated on February 27, 1995, 
due to insufficiency of service upon Sofia. 
23. Mark filed this nunc pro tunc divorce action on December 
19, 1994. Sofia was personally served in this action on December 
27, 1994, and has appeared generally and has continuously 
participated in this matter and has been represented by local 
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counsel. 
24. In November 1993 Mark and his wife went to Sweden to see 
Julia. Again Sofia only allowed Mark to see Julia during specified 
daytime hours and mostly inside her apartment/ but on an occasion 
outside Sofia's apartment Mark and his wife eluded Sofia and 
brought Julia back to Utah. 
25. Immediately upon returning to Utah/ in an effort to 
maintain contact between Julia and Sofia/ Mark telephoned Sofia and 
informed her that Julia was with him in the United States and that 
she was safe and happy. Julia spent the next two months living 
with Mark and his wife in Utah. 
26. Mark speaks Swedish fluently, and his wife is also quite 
proficient in Swedish. With their help, Julia became fairly 
proficient in English during the two months that she lived with 
them and could even read simple English words and count well past 
twenty. Julia also developed close/ trusting relationships with 
both her father and his wife during this time. 
27. During this time Mark took Julia to the dentist because 
he was concerned about what appeared to him to be significant decay 
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of at least eight of her teeth. Mark obtained an estimate from the 
dentist stating that it would cost approximately $1006 to repair 
the damage to her teeth. Mark was unable to have this dental work 
completed because of Sofia's subsequent illegal removal of Julia 
from the United States on February 1, 1994. 
28. In late December 1993, Mark received a telephone call 
from Lloyd Eldredge, a Utah attorney representing Sofia. He 
informed Mark that Sofia intended to file an action in Utah 
alleging that Mark had wrongfully removed Julia from Sweden in 
violation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction. This was the first Mark had heard 
of the Hague Convention. 
29. On January 26, 1994, Sofia filed a Hague Convention 
action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah (Civil 
Action No. 94-CV-87J) . On the same date Sofia secured a temporary 
ex parte Order for Issuance of Warrant in Lieu of Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, which ordered the issuance of a warrant directing any peace 
officer within Utah to take Julia into protective custody and 
release her to Sofia. This temporary order also set the case for 
8 
0 
a hearing on February 1, 1994, and ordered that Sofia or her agent 
not remove Julia from the State of Utah pending further order of 
the Federal Court. According to the Federal Court's Findings of 
Fact in that case/ the said ex parte Order did not affect the 
status of the parties' legal custody rights. 
30. In compliance with that ex parte Order/ and in an effort 
to spare his daughter the trauma of being taken into protective 
custody/ Mark arranged to deliver Julia directly to Sofia/ which he 
did in the presence of a U.S. Marshal on January 30/ 1994. 
31. Two days later/ on February 1/ 1994/ Sofia fled from the 
United States to Sweden with the parties' child/ in violation of 
the ex parte Order she had secured from the Federal Court. 
32. On February 17/ 1994/ the Federal Court entered an Order 
to Show Cause requiring Sofia to return to Utah with the child and 
show cause why she should not be found in contempt of court for her 
willful disobedience of the Federal Court Order. Sofia refused to 
comply with the Order to Show Cause, and on August 15/ 1994/ the 
Federal Court issued an Order finding Sofia in contempt and 
requiring her to cause Julia to be returned to the State of Utah 
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and the Federal Court within 30 days. Again, Sofia refused to 
comply. 
33. For over 2 years and 4 months following her illegal 
removal of Julia from Utah on February 1, 1994, Sofia actively 
prevented all contact between Mark and his daughter. During this 
time Mark made diligent efforts to re-establish contact with his 
child, including making regular calls to Sofia's phone number and 
leaving messages on her answering machine, as well as employing the 
assistance of a consular officer at the American Embassy in Sweden 
in an attempt to persuade Sofia to allow him to at least speak with 
his daughter on the phone, but all his efforts were fruitless. 
34. On June 12, 1995, the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah entered its final judgment on the merits of 
Sofia's Hague Convention case. The Court's ruling included the 
following: 
a. Utah is the only place Julia has ever lived with the 
consent of both parents; 
b. Julia has been habitually resident in Utah County, 
Utah, continuously since her birth in August 1990; 
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c. Under the Hague Convention, the proper forum for an 
adjudication of the parties' custody and visitation rights with 
respect to their daughter, Julia, is and always has been the state 
court in Utah County, Utah (i.e. this Court); 
d. Sofia's retention of Julia in Sweden in 1991 and her 
removal of Julia from Utah to Sweden in 1992 were wrongful under 
the Hague Convention; 
e. Any participation by Mark in Sofia's Swedish divorce 
action was without full knowledge or understanding of his legal 
rights, and did not amount to a waiver of any Hague Convention 
rights or remedies; 
f. None of the temporary custody orders obtained by 
Sofia in Sweden have ever been granted legal recognition under the 
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45c-l through -26 (1992 & Supp. 1994): 
g. Mark's right of joint legal custody of Julia has 
never been terminated under Utah law; 
h. Mark's return of Julia from Sweden to Utah in 
November 1993 was lawful under the Hague Convention and had the 
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effect of restoring Julia to her habitual residence in Utah; 
i. Both parties were ordered to "take all steps 
necessary to cause the return of the minor child/ Julia Sofia 
Larson# to the State of Utah so that a Utah state court can 
determine the issue of custody and related matters." In its ruling 
the Federal Court also officially requested "the assistance of the 
Contracting States in recognizing and enforcing [the federal] 
court's ruling under the Hague Convention." 
35. Sofia continues to willfully defy the final Hague 
Convention judgment from the Federal Court. 
36. The Findings of Fact/ Conclusions of Law and Order and 
Judgment of the U.S. District Court in the above-mentioned action 
are entitled to full faith and credit from this Court/ in 
accordance with Article IV of the Constitution of the United States 
of American and U.S.C. 11603 (a) . 
37. The U.S. District Court in the above-mentioned judgment 
found that "No substantive action has occurred in the Swedish 
divorce suit since the [Swedish] Court of Appeal made its order in 
January 1993" (regarding temporary visitation)/ and that "No final 
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hearing has been held in the [Swedish] District Court on the issues 
of custody and visitation." Nothing has been presented to this 
Court to suggest that these circumstances have changed. 
38. On February 16, 1995, Sofia appeared specially in this 
action and filed a Motion to Dismiss, contesting this Court's 
jurisdiction. At the hearing on her Motion on May 10, 1996, Sofia 
withdrew her objection and requested time to file an Answer to 
Mark's divorce and custody complaint, which she subsequently filed 
on May 30, 1995. 
39. Due to Sofia's defiance of the Hague Convention judgment 
from the Federal Court, Mark was required to travel to Sweden to 
seek enforcement of the judgment through a Hague Convention court 
action in that country. 
40. Mark and his wife spent two and one-half months in Sweden 
pursuing the case through the trial court and appellate court 
levels. During this entire time Sofia hid Julia from Mark and 
actively prevented all contact between Mark and his daughter, 
despite extensive efforts by Mark, his Swedish attorney, the 
American Embassy in Stockholm, and various Swedish authorities to 
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arrange for such contact. 
41. While in Sweden Mark read and saw numerous newspaper 
articles and television news reports in which Sofia was interviewed 
by the Swedish media. During several of the television interviews/ 
and also reportedly many of the newspaper interviews, Sofia had 
Julia with her and sometimes even participating in the interviews, 
while Sofia discussed her viewpoint on the parties' conflict over 
Julia and made very derogatory statements about Julia's father, 
including saying that he did not really care about Julia and only 
wanted her for a status symbol. 
42. While in Sweden Mark also obtained a videotape copy of a 
half-hour television docu-drama that aired throughout Scandinavia, 
which portrayed Sofia's version of the parties' conflict over their 
daughter. In it, Sofia was interviewed at length, with Julia by 
her side, and Julia was used as an actor to portray herself in 
professional ^re-enactments" depicting her being abducted by her 
father and found and rescued by her mother, both of whom were 
played by professional actors. 
43. The Swedish lower court denied Mark's petition for 
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Julia's return under the Hague Convention treaty, but on August 25, 
1995, the Swedish appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling 
and ordered that Julia be returned to the United States, and that 
Sofia must turn Julia over to Mark on or before August 31, 1995, 
with enforcement by the Swedish police if Sofia did not comply. 
44. Sofia continued to hide Julia from Mark, and on August 
30, 1995, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court gave Sofia leave 
to appeal the Swedish appellate court ruling and stayed its 
enforcement. 
45. Sofia has also appealed the Federal Court judgment to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. However, she has been 
denied any stay of the judgment. 
46. On October 12, 1995, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause 
hearing held October 10, 1995, at which Sofia was represented by 
counsel, this Court ordered Sofia to strictly comply with the 
Federal Court judgment and to immediately turn Julia over to Mark 
for return to Utah. On October 17, 1995, upon Sofia's motion, this 
Court modified its order by granting Sofia until November 13, 1995, 
to present herself and Julia to the Court, and ordered that if she 
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failed to do so she must turn Julia over to Mark for immediate 
return to Utah. Sofia willfully refused to comply in any respect. 
47. At a hearing on November 17, 1995, at which Sofia was 
represented by counsel, this Court found Sofia in contempt for her 
refusal to obey its order dated October 17, 1995, issued a pick-up 
order for the child, and ordered Sofia to pay Mark $750 for 
attorneys fees. The Court also ordered Sofia to appear in person 
at a hearing on December 8, 1995, otherwise a warrant would issue 
for her arrest. After a telephone conference with the parties' 
respective counsel on November 30, 1995, the Court further ordered 
Sofia to file an affidavit within 7 days disclosing the address 
where she and Julia were living. Sofia failed to comply with these 
orders in any respect, and at the hearing on December 8, 1995, 
Sofia was again found in contempt and a warrant was issued for her 
arrest. 
48. On December 20, 1995, the Swedish Supreme Administrative 
Court reversed the ruling of the Swedish appellate court and ruled 
that Sweden would not respect the final judgment of the Federal 
Court under the Hague Convention treaty and would not order the 
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return of Julia to the United States. The Swedish ruling does not 
purport to deal with or dispose of the issue of custody. 
49. Pursuant to an Order to Show Cause hearing on January 17, 
1996, at which Sofia was represented by counsel, this Court entered 
a temporary custody order on March 19, 1996, awarding sole custody 
of Julia to Mark and ordering Sofia to immediately return Julia to 
Utah, to pay to Mark an additional $750, and to pay Mark child 
support in accordance with the Utah state child support guidelines. 
Sofia willfully refused to comply in any respect. 
50. At an Order to Show Cause hearing on June 11, 1996, at 
which Sofia was represented by counsel, this Court ordered Sofia to 
initiate a weekly telephone conversation between Mark and Julia 
every Thursday at 10:00 a.m. Utah time. As of October 18, 1996, 
when this case went to trial, Sofia had complied with only 13 of 
the 19 ordered weekly phone conversations between Mark and Julia, 
and she personally monitored those conversations which she had 
allowed. 
51. Also at the June 11 hearing, Mark made a formal offer to 
pay all necessary expenses for Sofia and Julia to come to Utah for 
17 
0563 
the final custody hearing/ including round-trip travel expenses/ up 
to $500 per month for lodging in Utah/ and reimbursement for up to 
3 months of lost wages and for any tuition fees Sofia might 
forfeit. Although this offer was conveyed to Sofia by her counsel/ 
Sofia refused to return with Julia to Utah, 
. 52. At a hearing on July 2# 1996/ upon Sofia's motion this 
Court appointed Ms. Lorie Fowlke as Guardian Ad Litem for Julia. 
On July 31/ 1996/ Ms. Fowlke traveled to Sweden and spent a week 
there meeting with Julia/ Sofia/ Sofia's mother/ personnel at the 
day care center where Sofia has enrolled Julia# the parties' 
Swedish counsel/ and others. Ms. Fowlke submitted a formal report 
and recommendations to the Court on August 12 , 1996. 
53. At the scheduled trial on August 14# 1996/ at which Sofia 
was represented by counsel, this Court granted Sofia's motion for 
a continuance and set a new trial date for October 18 , 1996. In 
accordance with the written recommendations of the Guardian Ad 
Litem the Court ordered that temporary custody of Julia remain with 
Mark/ that Sofia be granted reasonable visitation/ that both 
parties engage in mediation/ and that Sofia take the divorce 
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education class by watching a videotape and then filing an 
affidavit stating that she had done so. The Court further ordered 
that Sofia file and serve answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents no later than September 1, 
1996, which interrogatories had been served upon her nearly 12 
months earlier, and that Sofia pay to Mark the two ordered $750 
money judgments no later than October 1, 1996, which judgments had 
been outstanding for 5 and 9 months, respectively. This order was 
entered on September 3, 1996, and except for some participation in 
unsuccessful mediation, Sofia willfully failed to comply with it in 
any respect. 
54. Mark has completed the mandatory divorce education class. 
55. Ever since at least February 1, 1994, Sofia has gone to 
great effort to prevent Julia from having any contact with her 
father. The supervised phone contact which Sofia has recently 
allowed was only allowed after this Court's specific order 
requiring her to initiate weekly phone contact between Julia and 
her father, which order Sofia has only partially complied with. 
56. Since her wrongful removal of Julia from this country in 
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January 1992, Sofia has, against Mark's wishes, taught Julia that 
her last name is Ohlander rather than Larson, although her correct 
legal surname in both Sweden and the United States is Larson. 
57. This Court finds that Sofia has been acting in her own 
self-interest and not in the best interests of the child. 
58. Sofia is in flagrant contempt of the orders of this 
Court, and this Court has no reason to expect that she would comply 
with any visitation awarded to Mark if this Court were to grant her 
custody of Julia. 
59. While Sofia and Mark were married and living together 
they shared the responsibility for and care of Julia fairly 
equally. During Sofia's wrongful retention of Julia in Sweden in 
the first part of 1991 and subsequent to her wrongful removals of 
Julia from the United States in January 1992 and February 1994, 
Sofia has forcibly excluded Mark from the day to day care of Julia 
through unlawful violations of his custody rights. 
60. Mark has been remarried for over three years and can 
provide a stable family environment for Julia with himself, his 
wife, Julia's one year-old half-sister Natalie, and any other 
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children Mark and his wife may have in the future. Mark has held 
the same employment as an x-ray optics engineer at MOXTEK, Inc. for 
over 6 years and plans to continue working there. He has flexible 
work hours and has therefore the latitude to deal with parental 
responsibilities that may arise even during business hours. Mark's 
wife is a full-time homemaker and mother/ and can therefore provide 
full-time care for Julia while Mark is at work. No such ability to 
provide a stable family environment or constant primary care for 
Julia has been demonstrated by Sofia, and according to the 
information provided to the Court by Sofia and the Guardian Ad 
Litem/ Sofia has not remarried and has had Julia registered in day 
care in Sweden continuously since August 1993. 
61. Mark has consistently affirmed to this Court and 
demonstrated that he feels that it is very important for Julia to 
have a close/ loving relationship with her mother, and that he 
would work toward that goal if granted sole custody. Mark's wife 
has also attested to this same view and intent. In contrast/ Sofia 
has consistently and unequivocally demonstrated a clear disregard 
for Julia's need to have a close/ loving relationship with her 
21 
0559 
father. 
62. It is in the best interests of the parties minor child 
that she be placed in an environment where there is considerably-
greater likelihood that people will consider the true needs of the 
child# especially her need to maintain a loving, healthy 
relationship with both parents. This is most likely to occur in 
the home of Mark and his present wife, not in the home of Sofia. 
63. It is in Julia's best interests that she be in Mark's 
sole custody. 
64. It is in Julia's best interests that there be a ™break-in 
period" during which Sofia comes to Utah so that Julia can spend 
time with her mother daily while in the custody of her father. 
65. It is in Julia's best interests that her relationship 
with her mother continue via liberal visitation, both inside of 
Utah and in the country of Sweden, but this must be arranged so as 
to ensure that Sofia will not violate Mark's rights of custody of 
Julia. 
66. In light of the parties' differing countries of 
residence, it is in Julia's best interests that her parents 
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actively help her acquire and maintain the ability to communication 
fluently in both English and Swedish. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the divorce and custody 
matters and personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce, nunc pro 
tunc, effective October 21, 1993. 
3. In accordance with Article IV of the Constitution of the 
United States of America and U.S.C. 11603(a), this Court should 
afford full faith and credit to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order and Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Utah, dated June 12, 1995, in the Hague Convention case 
filed by Sofia. 
4. None of the temporary custody orders obtained by Sofia in 
Sweden have ever been granted legal recognition under the Utah 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l 
through -26 (1992 & Supp. 1994), and they have no legal force or 
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validity in the State of Utah. 
5. Neither party should be awarded alimony. 
6. The present distribution of personal property and debts 
should be confirmed. 
7. Permanent sole custody of the parties' minor child, Julia 
Sofia Larson, is awarded to Mark. 
8. Sofia is awarded liberal visitation both in Utah and in 
Sweden, subject to appropriate restrictions that will ensure that 
she does not violate Mark's rights of custody. 
9. Both parties shall actively help Julia acquire and 
maintain the ability to communicate fluently in both English and 
Swedish. 
10. Sofia shall immediately return Julia to Utah and turn her 
over to Mark. To assist in making the transition easier for Julia, 
Sofia shall be allowed daily visitation with Julia in Utah during 
an initial 3-week ubreak-in" period, which visitation shall be 
arranged and overseen by the Guardian Ad Litem. 
11. If Sofia fails to turn Julia over to Mark within 14 days 
of the entry of this decree, all law enforcement officers or other 
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appropriate authorities of the State of Utah/ the United States of 
American, the country of Sweden/ or any other jurisdiction where 
the child may be located/ shall immediately pick up the parties' 
minor child/ Julia Larson/ and turn her over to her father/ Mark 
Larson. 
12. Mark is awarded child support from Sofia in accordance 
with the Utah State child support guidelines. Mark is not and 
shall not be required to pay child support to Sofia for the times 
when she is or has been unlawfully withholding Julia in violation 
of his custody rights. Mark is entitled to claim Julia as a 
dependent for tax purposes, starting on the tax return due April 
15/ 1997. 
13. Sofia is in contempt of court for her willful violations 
of this Court's orders dated March 19, 1996/ and September 3/ 1996. 
14. Sofia shall immediately pay Mark the two $750 judgments 
already entered against her, as well as an additional $750 as a 
sanction for her contempt of the temporary custody order dated 
March 19, 1996/ and $500 for her willful failure to answer 
Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
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Documents as ordered on September 3, 1996, for a total of $2,750. 
15. As long as either party remains a resident of the State 
of Utah, this Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to modify, 
negate, or supersede any of the terms of this decree. 
16. This Court respectfully requests the Swedish courts, law 
enforcement officers, and other authorities to recognize, honor and 
enforce this decree. 
*L 
DATED t h i s \"r day of JU , 1 9 9 7 , 
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the Uncompahgre Reservation, and the three 
disputed categories of non-trust lands dis-
cussed above.6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the 
defendants' motion to recall our mandate in 
Ute Indian Tribe III, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th 
Cir.1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 
994, 107 S.Ct. 596, 93 L.Ed.2d 596 (1986). 
Rather, we MODIFY our mandate in Ute 
Indian Tribe III as set out above and RE-
MAND with instruction that the district 
court consider the Tribe's request for perma-
nent injunctive relief in light of this opinion. 
p | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
*> 
Karin Sofia OHLANDER, In the Matter of 
Julia Larson, a Minor Child, f/k/a Karin 
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Mark Andrew LARSON, Respondent-
Appellee. 
Nos. 95-4114 & 96-4080. 
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Tenth Circuit. 
June 3, 1997. 
After father took child from Sweden to 
United States without mother's permission, 
^mother, a Swedish citizen, filed Hague Con-
vention petition seeking child's return to 
Sweden. Mother subsequently took child 
from United States to Sweden, in violation of 
court order, and was found in contempt. Fa-
ther then filed Hague Convention petition in 
Sweden for return of child to United States. 
Mother filed motion to voluntarily dismiss 
her district court petition. The United 
6. We decline to address whether any portion of 
the non-trust lands opened in 1905 might still 
constitute Indian country under section 1151 (b) 
as a "dependent Indian community" because 
v. LARSON 1531 
1 (lOthCir. 1997) 
States District Court for the District of Utah, 
Bruce S. Jenkins, J., denied motion, and 
subsequently ordered child's return to Unit-
ed States. Mother appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Brorby, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
district court abused its discretion in denying 
motion to dismiss solely on basis of mother's 
contempt of its order not to remove child, 
and (2) dismissal of mother's petition was 
warranted. 
Reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions. 
Murphy, Circuit Judge, dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Federal Courts <S=*818 
Court of Appeals will review district 
court's decision to deny voluntary dismissal 
after defendant has filed answer for abuse of 
discretion. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 
28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1700 
Absent legal prejudice to defendant, dis-
trict court normally should grant voluntary 
dismissal after defendant has filed answer. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1700 
In determining whether defendant 
would suffer legal prejudice from voluntary 
dismissal after defendant has filed answer, 
district court should consider, among other 
relevant factors, defendant's effort and ex-
pense in preparing for trial, excessive delay 
and lack of diligence on part of plaintiff, 
insufficient explanation of need for dismissal, 
and present stage of litigation. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700 
Each factor considered in determining 
whether defendant would suffer legal preju-
dice from voluntary dismissal after defendant 
has filed answer need not be resolved in 
favor of plaintiff for dismissal to be appropri-
ate, nor need each factor be resolved in favor 
that question is not properly before the court. 
The district court may be asked to consider the 
question upon remand. 
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of defendant for denial of motion to be prop-
er. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700 
In determining whether to grant volun-
tary dismissal after defendant has filed an-
swer, district court should endeavor to insure 
that substantial justice is afforded to both 
parties. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
6. Federal Civil Procedure <3>1693,1700 
In determining whether to grant volun-
tary dismissal after defendant has filed an-
swer, court must consider equities not only 
facing defendant, but also those facing plain-
tiff; court's refusal to do so is denial of full 
and complete exercise of judicial discretion. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
7. Federal Civil Procedure <S=>1700 
When considering motion to voluntarily 
dismiss case after defendant has filed an-
swer, court must remember that the impor-
tant factors in determining legal prejudice 
are those involving parties, not court's time 
or effort spent on case. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
8. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700 
Court abuses its discretion when it de-
nies motion to voluntarily dismiss case after 
defendant has filed answer based on its own 
inconvenience. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
9. Federal Civil Procedure <3=*1700 
District court abused its discretion when 
it denied mother's motion to voluntarily dis-
miss Hague Convention petition for return of 
child to Sweden solely on grounds of her 
contempt of its order not to remove child, 
and without considering any additional cir-
cumstances, including merits of motion. In-
ternational Child Abduction Remedies Act, 
§ 4, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ. 
Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
10. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1693 
Whether motion to voluntarily dismiss 
case after defendant has filed answer may be 
granted is matter initially left to district 
court's discretion, but such discretion does 
not excuse court's failure to exercise any 
discretion, nor does it save unpermitted exer-
cise of discretion from reversal. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
11. Federal Courts <3=>812 
Court abuses its discretion when it fails 
to consider applicable legal standard or facts 
upon which exercise of its discretionary judg-
ment is based. 
12. Federal Courts <3=>937.1 
Although district court's failure to apply 
correct legal standard when it denied moth-
er's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague 
Convention petition for return of child to 
Sweden could serve as basis for remand, 
Court of Appeals would determine merits of 
mother's motion, as no dispute regarding 
underlying facts existed and record was ade-
quate to address issues of concern. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
13. Federal Civil Procedure <&=>1700 
Mother should have been allowed to vol-
untarily dismiss her Hague Convention peti-
tion for return of child to Sweden, after 
mother had taken child to Sweden and father 
had filed his own Hague Convention petition, 
in Sweden, for return of child to United 
States, as father would not suffer legal preju-
dice from dismissal, claims and defenses of 
both mother and father could be more fairly 
adjudicated in Sweden, and failure to grant 
motion to dismiss could create new incentive 
for parents to flee Hague Convention pro-
ceedings in hope of obtaining second, more 
favorable Convention determination in anoth-
er country. International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act, § 4, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603; 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
14. Federal Civil Procedure ®=>1701.1 
For purposes of determining whether 
mother was entitled to voluntarily dismiss 
her Hague Convention petition for return rf 
child to SwTeden, there was no improper dd-
lay or lack of diligence on mother's part 
sufficient to legally prejudice father. Inter* 
national Child Abduction Remedies Act, | %' 
42 U.S.C.A. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ.Pro& 
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
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15. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700 
Fot purposes of determining whether 
mother was entitled to voluntarily dismiss 
her Hague Convention petition for return of 
child to Sweden, reasons mother gave for 
granting motion to dismiss, including conten-
tion that petition was moot because child was 
no longer in United States, that Hague Con-
vention allowed for dismissal of proceedings 
trader such circumstances, and that father 
had initiated duplicative action in Sweden, 
were not insufficient such that* they preju-^ 
diced father. International Child Abduction-
Remedies Act, § 4, 42 U.S.CJL • § 11603; 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.CJL 
16. Federal Civil Procedure <®=»780 
Hague Convention petition father filed 
in Sweden for return of his child to United 
States would not be construed as counter-
claim to mother's prior Hague Convention 
petition, filed in United States, for return of 
phild to Sweden, as father's claims were as-
serted in court of another jurisdiction. In-
ternational Child Abduction Remedies Act, 
§V42*U.S.C.A. § H603; Fed.Rules Civ. 
Proc^ule 8(c), 28 U.S.CA. 
17. Federal Civil Procedure ®=»1700 
In determining whether to grant moth-
er's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague 
Convention petition for return of child to 
Sweden, which motion was based, in part, on 
father's subsequent Hague Convention peti-
tion filed in Sweden, district court should 
have considered importance of proper, urn-
form interpretation of Hague Conventipp, 
along with Convention's purpose. Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act, § 4, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C A 
18. Parent and Child <S=*18 
Treaties @=>13 
Under contemplated procedures of 
Hague Convention, district court, in ruling on 
mother's Hague Convention petition for re-
turn of child to Sweden, should not have 
considered mother's removal of child from 
United States to Sweden m violation of court 
order, as father had not filed cross-petition 
to adjudicate propriety of mother's removal. 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 
§ 4(b, e), 42 U.S.CA. § 11603(b, e). 
19. Contempt <3=>70 
Court's interest in ensuring party's com^ 
pliance with its orders is great one, enforce-1 
able by fines or imprisonment. 
20. Contempt <S=>70 
When imposing civil contempt sanctions, 
court is obliged to use least possible power 
adequate to end proposed. 
21. Parent and Chjld <®=>18 
Treaties <®=»13 
District court should not have denied 
mother's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague 
Convention petition for return of child to4 
Sweden, as civil contempt sanction for moth-
er's conduct in taking child back to Sweden 
in violation of court order, as other measures 
were available to compel compliance with 
order, such as personal sanctions against' 
mother, or possibly staying decision pending 
child's return. International Child Abduc-
tion Remedies Act, §§ 4, 5, 42 U.S.CA 
§§ 11603,11604. 
Darnel F. Bertch (Billie C. Nielsen, with 
him on the brief), of Bertch & Birch, Salt 
Lake City, UT, for Petitioner-Appellant. 
Gary L. Paxtpn (Rodney G. Snow with Jiim 
on the briefs) of Clyde, Snow & SwensQn, 
P.C., Salt J.ake City, UT, for Respon4§ntr-
Appellee. 
Before BRORBY, BARRETT ancj 
MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 
BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 
Ms. Ohlander appeals the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah's judg-
ment denying her petition for the return of 
her daughter Julia to Sweden under the 
Hague Convention, ordering Julia's return to 
Utah, denying her two motions to withdraw 
and dismiss her petition, denying her mo-
tions to stay enforcement of the judgment, 
and a subsequent judgment denying her Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to set aside the judg-
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ment.1 Applying the standards under Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) in the Hague Convention 
context, we determine the district court 
abused its discretion in denying the motion 
to dismiss. We reverse and remand to the 
district court with instructions to dismiss Ms. 
Ohlander's petition. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Hague Convention on the Civil As-
pects of International Child Abduction (the 
"Convention"), as implemented by both the 
United States Congress through the Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994), and Sweden, 
was adopted by the signatory nations "to 
protect children internationally from the 
harmful effects of their wrongful removal or 
retention and to establish procedures to en-
sure their prompt return to the State of their 
habitual residence." Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Ab-
duction, Dec. 23, 1981, Preamble, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 10494,10,498 (1986). The Convention is 
meant to provide for a child's prompt return 
once it has been established the child has 
been "wrongfully removed" to or retained in 
any affiliated state. Id,, art. 1, 51 Fed.Reg. 
at 10498. 
Under the Convention, a removal or reten-
tion is "wrongful" if: 
a. it is in breach of rights of custody 
attributed to a person, an institution or 
any other body, either jointly or alone, 
under the law of the State in which the 
child was habitually resident immediately 
before the removal or retention; and 
b. at the time of removal or retention 
those rights were actually exercised, either 
jointly or alone, or would have been so 
exercised but for removal or retention. 
Id, art. 3, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10498. Once a 
removal is deemed "wrongful," "the authority 
concerned shall order the return of the 
child." Id., art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499. 
However, the Convention provides for sever-
al exceptions to return if the person opposing 
return can show any of the following: 1) the 
1. Ms Ohlander's appeal of the district court's 
denial of her motion to set aside the judgment 
under Fed R Civ P 60(b) was consolidated with 
the direct appeal 
person requesting return was not, at the time 
of the retention or removal, actually exercis-
ing custody rights or had consented to or 
subsequently acquiesced in the removal or 
retention, id., art. 13a, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499, 
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); 2) the return of 
the child would result in grave risk of physi-
cal or psychological harm to the child, id.,\ 
art. 13b, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); 3) the 
return of the child "would not be permitted > 
by the fundamental principles of the request-, 
ed State relating to the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms," id., art., 
20, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10500, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(e)(2)(A); or 4) the proceeding was 
commenced more than one year after the' 
abduction and the child has become settled in 
the new environment, id., art. 12, 51 Fed.4 
Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). 
II. FACTS 
Ms. Ohlander, a Swedish citizen, and Mr. 
Larson, a United States citizen, were mar-
ried in Utah in 1989. In August 1990, their 
daughter Julia was born in Provo, Utah. 
During the Christmas holiday season of 
1990-91, when Julia was five months old, the 
entire family traveled to Sweden to visit Ms. 
Ohlander's family with the intent to return to* 
their Utah home in January 1991. After 
arriving in Sweden, Ms. Ohlander decided to 
remain in Sweden with Julia; Ms. Ohlander 
went into hiding with her daughter and sev-
ered contact with her husband. Mr. Larson
 ( 
returned to Utah alone in mid-January 1991. 
By April 1991, Mr. Larson had reestab-' 
lished contact with Ms. Ohlander. In June 
1991, with Julia now almost a year old, Ms.' 
Ohlander returned to Utah to be with Mr.? 
Larson. Ms. Ohlander and Julia remained 
with Mr. Larson for seven months. On Jani-* 
uary 13, 1992, Ms. Ohlander returned withj 
Julia to Sweden without Mr. Larson's con-
sent. 
By November 1993,2 Julia had resided con*| 
tinuously in Sweden for almost two years,
 l 
and was a little over three years old. Mr.) 
2. Between January 1992 and November 1993. 
Ms Ohlander and Mr Larson were participating' 
in divorce and custody proceedings taking placi) 
in Sweden. 
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Larson returned to Sweden with his new wife 
to see Julia, and during one visitation, ap-
plied the law of "grab and run" taking Julia 
back to Utah without Ms. Ohlander's con-
sent. In January 1994, Ms. Ohlander filed a 
petition seeking her daughter's return pursu-
ant to the Hague Convention in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah. 
Ms. Ohlander also secured an ex parte Order 
for Issuance of Warrant in Lieu of Writ of 
Habeas Corpus from the district court, di-
recting peace officers to take Julia into pro-
tective custody and to release her to Ms. 
Ohlander, but prohibiting Ms. Ohlander from 
removing Julia from Utah pending further 
order. Mr. Larson delivered Julia to Ms. 
Ohlander on January 30, 1994, and on Febru-
ary 1, 1994, Ms. Ohlander disobeyed the 
court's order and applied her own version of 
the law of "grab and run" by returning to 
Sweden with Julia. 
In August 1994, shortly after Julia's fourth 
birthday, the district court entered an order 
finding Ms. Ohlander in contempt and direct-
ing her to return Julia to the United States 
within thirty days. Ms. Ohlander failed to 
comply. Two months later, in October 1994, 
following Ms. Ohlander's and Julia's return 
to Sweden, Mr. Larson filed a Convention 
application for Julia's return with the United 
States Central Authority, which was forward-
ed to Sweden's Central Authority.3 Ms. Ohl-
ander then filed a motion, pursuant to Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2), to dismiss her district court 
petition, based, in part, on the Convention's 
art. 12, which authorizes a judicial authority 
to stay or dismiss the application or judicial 
proceedings seeking a child's return.4 
Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 
10499. In January 1995, prior to the hearing 
on Ms. Ohlander's motion, Mr. Larson peti-
tioned the Sweden court pursuant to the 
Convention for Julia's return on the ground 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 11602 distinguishes between appli-
cations and petitions filed under the Convention. 
A petition exists upon a person filing for relief in 
court, while an application exists upon a person 
filing with the United States' or any other coun-
try's Central Authority for a child's return. 42 
U.S.C. § 11602(1), (4). 
4. Specifically, the Convention's art. 12 states: 
Where the judicial or administrative authority 
in the requested State has reason to believe 
Ms. Ohlander had '"wrongfully removed" her 
from Utah.5 
The United States district court conducted 
a hearing on Ms. Ohlander's motion to dis-
miss. During that hearing, the United 
States district court was informed of Mr. 
Larson's Hague Convention proceeding in 
Sweden. The district court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss solely on the basis of Ms. 
Ohlander's contempt of its order not to re-
move Julia from Utah. Ms. Ohlander later 
orally renewed her motion to dismiss, which 
the district court denied on the same 
grounds. 
The district court conducted a bench trial 
on Ms. Ohlander's Hague Convention petition 
to determine the issues of habitual residence 
and wrongful removal pursuant to the Con-
vention. However, neither Ms. Ohlander nor 
Julia was present for the hearing, nor did 
they testify by other means. Ms. Ohlander 
presented no live witnesses and relied only 
on the stipulated facts set out in the Pretrial 
Order. Ultimately, the district court found 
Julia was at all times a "habitual resident" of 
Utah, and as such, Ms. Ohlander's retention 
of Julia in Sweden in 1991, and her removals 
of Julia from Utah in 1992 and 1994 were all 
'"wrongful" under the Convention. Accord-
ingly, the district court ordered Julia's imme-
diate return to Utah and requested the aid of 
the Contracting States in achieving that goal. 
Following the United States district court's 
decision, the Sweden courts held hearings to 
determine the merits of Mr. Larson's peti-
tion. Both Mr. Larson and Ms. Ohlander 
were present during the Sweden court pro-
ceeding. The Sweden Supreme Administra-
tive Court held Julia's habitual residence 
changed from Utah to Sweden after she had 
lived in Sweden for twelve months following 
the January 1992 abduction—a decision di-
that the child has been taken to another state, 
it may stay the proceedings, or dismiss the 
application for the return of the child. 
Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499. 
5. Presumably, Mr. Larson filed the petition in 
addition to the application to prevent Ms. Ohlan-
der from asserting the "settled environment" de-
fense as it pertained to Ms. Ohlander's 1994 
removal. This defense is discussed infra at p. 
1540. 
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rectly in conflict with the United States dis-
trict court's holding. 
Once the Sweden court had made its rul-
ing, Ms. Ohlander filed a motion to stay 
enforcement of the United States district 
court's order, and a motion to set aside the 
United States' judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
60(b). The United States district court de-
nied the motions, again solely on the basis of 
Ms. Ohlander's contempt. We are present-
ed, therefore, with two international deci-
sions standing in direct conflict, and it is this 
contradiction we attempt to resolve for both 
the present case and for future cases. 
III. DISCUSSION 
This case presents issues novel to this 
court, and according to our research, novel to 
this country. Our aim is to provide courts 
with guidance in future similar cases, namely, 
where two civil actions under the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abductions are filed in disparate 
courts due to a child's removal from the court 
of first jurisdiction. Also, our aim is to give 
meaning to the Convention's intended pur-
pose of discouraging parents from fleeing 
with their children in search of a favorable 
decision. Notably, we are faced not only 
with issues of the proper interpretation of 
bare text in the form of the Hague Conven-
tion treaty, but also with the plight of a now 
six-year-old girl to whom the law of "grab 
and run" repeatedly has been applied. 
We therefore must examine the following 
competing interests of: the district court en-
suring compliance with its orders; the proce-
dural conduct of the parties; and most im-
portant, the Convention's intent and our duty 
to see that intent justly carried out. Against 
this backdrop, we attempt to untangle the 
Gordian knot the parents, together, have 
seen fit to tie. 
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS 
Even though Ms. Ohlander appeals several 
of the district court's rulings, our decision on 
the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) is dispositive. Thus, we 
need not address the remaining issues. We 
therefore turn our focus to whether the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in denying 
Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). 
A. Relevant Facts 
Ms. Ohlander's first motion to dismiss was 
filed shortly after Mr. Larson filed his Hague 
application for Julia's return to Utah with the 
United States Central Authority. Ms. Ohl-
ander's counsel raised her second motion to 
dismiss orally during the bench trial. Rely-
ing on the Convention's art. 12, Ms. Ohlander 
argued in her first motion to dismiss that 
because Julia was no longer in the United 
States and because Mr. Larson had initiated 
his own Hague Convention application, the 
United States district court should dismiss 
the petition for Julia's return to Sweden. By 
the time the United States district court 
heard arguments regarding the first motion 
to dismiss, Mr. Larson had initiated his own 
petition in the Sweden courts regarding the 
wrongfulness of Julia's removal from the 
United States. The district court was aware 
of the duplicative judicial action in Sweden. 
Notwithstanding its knowledge of Mr. Lar-
son's Hague Convention proceedings in Swe-
den, the district court summarily denied Ms. 
Ohlander's motion solely on the basis of Ms. 
Ohlander's contempt stating: 
I'm not going to grant the Motion to 
Dismiss and I'm not going to grant it 
simply because this woman, the petitioner, 
in my opinion, isn't in a position to ask me 
to do that, because she's in violation of the 
orders of this Court. She is simply in 
violation. She invoked the jurisdiction. 
She asked for our help, and then she, 
contrary to the order of the Court, ran. 
In her second motion to dismiss, Ms. Ohlan-
der relied again on the Convention's art. 12, 
the fact that Julia was no longer in the 
United States, and the fact that Mr. Larson 
had initiated judicial proceedings in Sweden. 
The district court again denied Ms. Ohlan-
der's second motion to dismiss due to her 
contumacious conduct. 
B. Relevant Factors Considered Under 
41(a)(2)IStandard of Review 
[1-4] Once a defendant files an answer,, 
as was the case here, a plaintiff may volun-
tarily dismiss an action only upon order of 
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the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). We review judicial discretion, 
the district court's decision to deny a volun-
tary dismissal under such conditions for 
abuse of discretion. American Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Bic Corp., 931 F.2d 1411, 1412 
(10th Cir.1991). Absent "legal prejudice" to 
the defendant, the district court normally 
should grant such a dismissal. See Andes v. 
Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 (4th Cir. 
1986) (voluntary dismissal "should not be de-
nied absent substantial prejudice to the de-
fendant"); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 
F.2d 855, 856-57 (11th Cir.1986) ("in most 
cases a dismissal should be granted unless 
the defendant will suffer clear legal preju-
dice"). The parameters of what constitutes 
"legal prejudice" are not entirely clear, but 
relevant factors the district court should con-
sider include: the opposing party's effort and 
expense in preparing for trial; excessive de-
lay and lack of diligence on the part of the 
movant; insufficient explanation of the need 
for a dismissal; and the present stage of 
litigation. Phillips U.S.A, Inc. v. Allflex 
U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir.1996). 
Each factor need not be resolved in favor of 
the moving party for dismissal to be appro-
priate, nor need each factor be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party for denial of the 
motion to be proper. Id. at 358. 
The above list of factors is by no means 
exclusive. Id. at 358. Any other relevant 
factors should come into the district court's 
equation. In fact, in the context of this 
Hague Convention proceeding, the district 
court was impressed with a duty to exercise 
its discretion by carefully appraising any ad-
ditional factors unique to the context of this 
case, including the interests in comity, uni-
form interpretation of the Convention and 
the importance of giving import to the Hague 
Convention's intended purpose as relevant to 
the motion to dismiss. 
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Id. at 297. In a complex, 
emotional case such as this, it is critically 
important when considering a motion to dis-
miss, the court give the equities of the plain-
tiff the attention deserved. 
[7,8] Finally, when considering a motion 
to dismiss, a court must remember the im-
portant factors in determining legal prejudice 
are those involving the parties, not the 
court's time or effort spent on the case. 
Clark v. Tansy, 13 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th 
Cir. 1993). A court abuses its discretion 
when denying a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 41(a)(2) based on its inconvenience. Id. 
at 1411. 
[5,6] The district court should endeavor 
to insure substantial justice is accorded to 
both parties. 9 Charles Alan Wright and 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 2364 at 278 (2d ed. 1994). A court, 
therefore, must consider the equities not only 
facing the defendant, but also those facing 
the plaintiff; a court's refusal to do so is a 
denial of a full and complete exercise of 
[9-11] In sum, the district court was obli-
gated to consider the novelty of the circum-
stances surrounding this case. Instead, the 
court did not consider the merits of Ms. 
Ohlander's motion due exclusively to her con-
tumacious conduct. It is true Ms. Ohlander 
blatantly violated the court's orders and ab-
sconded to Sweden with Julia in tow. We 
refuse to condone such conduct. However, 
neither can we condone a court ignoring its 
duty to consider the merits of a motion to 
dismiss simply because a party has violated 
its orders. Whether a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 41(a)(2) may be granted is a 
matter initially left to the district court's 
discretion, but such discretion does not ex-
cuse a court's failure to exercise any discre-
tion, nor does it save an unpermitted exercise 
of discretion from reversal. Alamance In-
dus., Inc. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 146-47 
(1st Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 831, 82 S.Ct. 
53, 7 L.Ed.2d 33 (1961). A clear example of 
an abuse of discretion exists where the trial 
court fails to consider the applicable legal 
standard or the facts upon which the exercise 
of its discretionary judgment is based. See 
McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 888 
F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (reviewing a 
district court's 60(a) motion under an abuse 
of discretion standard). We believe the dis-
trict court's decision to deny Ms. Ohlander's 
motion solely on the grounds of her contempt 
and without considering any additional cir-
cumstances, amounts to a failure to exercise 
discretion, and is, consequently, an abuse of 
that discretion. 
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C. Merits of Ms. Ohlander's 41(a)(2) 
Motion 
1. Traditional Factors 
[12] Although the district court's failure 
to apply the correct legal standard could 
serve as a basis for remand, in the interest of 
efficiency and judicial economy, and in the 
interest of providing immediate guidance as 
to the most appropriate direction of this case 
in light of the Convention's purpose, we turn 
to the merits of Ms. Ohlander's motion to 
dismiss. Clark, 13 F.3d at 1411-13 (consid-
ering on appeal the merits of motion to dis-
miss after district court abused its discre-
tion); Park County Resource Council v. 
United States Dept of Agric, 817 F.2d 609, 
617-18 (10th Cir.1987) ("Although failure to 
apply correct legal standard could be basis 
for remand to the district court, we have 
found that remand is not necessary where 
there is no dispute regarding the underlying 
facts and where it is in the interest of judicial 
economy and efficiency to decide the mat-
ter."); see also McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 
606, 613 (D.C.Cir.1980) (although inadequate 
findings and conclusions may be remanded to 
the district court for supplementation, appel-
late court will not remand for more specific 
findings if doing so will consume judicial 
resources without serving any purpose). We 
believe, as is obvious from our remaining 
analysis, no dispute regarding the underlying 
facts exists and the existing record is ade-
quate to address the issues of concern. 
[13,14] Mr. Larson argues that to grant 
Ms. Ohlander's motion would subject him to 
legal prejudice. More specifically, Mr. Lar-
6. The dissent opines our statement here "is a 
conclusory statement lacking support in the rec-
ord" because between the time Ms. Ohlander 
initiated the Convention proceeding and filed her 
motion to dismiss, Ms. Ohlander "did virtually 
nothing to affirmatively move her case along." 
Unfortunately, this court has yet to explicitly 
define "diligence" in the context of a Rule 
41(a)(2) motion to dismiss. While the dissent 
purports an "affirmative act" requirement, the 
cases from this circuit touching on the issue 
characterize diligence quite differently. Allflex, 
11 F.3d at 358 (movant's request for additional 
time to respond to proffered facts and to conduct 
further discovery constituted lack of diligence); 
Clark, 13 F.3d at 1412 (movant's failure to ex-
haust state claims for purposes of habeas review 
"cannot be construed as lack of diligence"); see 
son argues he would be unfairly prejudiced 
by Ms. Ohlander's excessive delay and lack of 
diligence, and by the lack of a sufficient 
explanation in favor of dismissal. See All-
flex, 77 F.3d at 358. Mr. Larson argues Ms. 
Ohlander's filing of her motion to dismiss 
eleven months after the initiation of the pro^  
ceedings and after Mr. Larson had requested 
a final pretrial hearing constitutes delay and 
lack of diligence. However, while Ms. Ohlan-
der moved to dismiss her petition eleven 
months after she initiated the proceeding, 
our examination of the record illustrates Ms. 
Ohlander filed her motion to dismiss only 
after Mr. Larson had filed his application for 
Julia's return with the United States Central 
Authority. Therefore, the most persuasive 
reason to file a motion to dismiss did not 
arise until eleven months following the initial 
proceeding's initiation. As a result, the tim-
ing of Ms. Ohlander's motion could not con-
stitute excessive delay sufficient to legally 
prejudice Mr. Larson. Moreover, the record 
shows Ms. Ohlander's counsel was actively 
and diligently moving forward with the case 
regardless of Ms. Ohlander's absence. 
Counsel was present at and participated in 
every hearing.6 Therefore, we conclude 
there was no improper delay or lack of dili-
gence on Ms. Ohlander's part sufficient to 
legally prejudice Mr. Larson. 
[15] Further, we believe the reasons Ms. 
Ohlander has given for granting the motion 
to dismiss are not insufficient such that they 
prejudice Mr. Larson. In her motions to 
dismiss, Ms. Ohlander argued her petition 
was moot and because Julia was no longer in 
also, United States v. Outboard Marine Corp, 7891 
F.2d 497, 504 (7th Cir.1986) (lack of diligence • 
may be shown by evidence of bad faith or unwar-, 
ranted delay). We are not certain what "affirma-
tive acts" the dissent would require, and to the 
extent it would require a movant to file addition-
al motions prior to a motion to dismiss, all in the 
name of "affirmative acts," we disagree. In fact, 
affirmative acts to prolong litigation more typi-u 
cally provide a basis for finding excessive delay; 
and lack of diligence. See, e.g., Allflex, 11 F.3d at 
358. The record before us shows counsel was 
present at and fully participated in all hearings 
and, outside the motions to dismiss, which were' 
timely filed, did not cause undue delay. Conse-; 
quently, there is adequate support in the record 
to reach our conclusion. 
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Utah, the Convention's art. 12 allowed for a tice requires us 
stay or dismissal of the proceedings. Ms. 
Ohlander also relied on the fact Mr. Larson 
himself initiated a duplicative action in Swe-
den as further support for the imposition of 
the Convention's art. 12 dismissal provision. 
Certainly, the first two reasons alone are 
insufficient to support a motion to dismiss 
and could give parents an undue incentive to 
flee from Hague Convention proceedings. 
However, as discussed at length below, we 
place greater weight on Ms. Ohlander's prof-
fered reasons that Mr. Larson initiated a 
second action in Sweden and that the Con-
vention's art. 12 lends support for dismissing 
the United States proceeding. Ms. Ohlan-
der's reasons for requesting the motion to 
dismiss are not insufficient such that they 
legally prejudice Mr. Larson. Rather, as 
Ms. Ohlander emphasizes, by initiating a ju-
dicial proceeding in Sweden Mr. Larson him-
self, along with the Convention's terms, pro-
vided the most persuasive reason to dismiss 
the United States district court proceeding. 
Mr. Larson is hard pressed to argue he is 
prejudiced by his own actions. 
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to construe Mr. Larson's 
response to Ms. Ohlander's petition as a 
counterclaim in this case. Mr. Larson chose 
to assert his claims in a court of another 
jurisdiction. Justice does not require us to 
tortuously construe his response to Ms. Ohl-
ander's petition simply to retain jurisdiction 
over this matter. Had Mr. Larson wanted 
the United States courts to adjudicate his 
claim Ms. Ohlander wrongfully removed Julia 
from Utah, he would have been far better 
served by filing a cross-petition with the 
district court rather than initiating an entire-
ly new proceeding in Sweden. Consequently, 
we refuse to construe Mr. Larson's response 
as a counterclaim.7 
2. Additional Relevant Factors 
[16] Mr. Larson also argues the motion 
to dismiss should not be granted because his 
response to Ms. Ohlander's Hague Conven-
tion petition should be construed as a coun-
terclaim. It is true a court may construe a 
pleading mistakenly designated as a defense 
as a counterclaim when justice requires. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). However, because Mr. 
Larson filed his own Hague Convention peti-
tion in Sweden, we remain unconvinced jus-
7. The dissent claims that by relying on the fact 
Mr. Larson initiated the second proceeding in 
Sweden we are somehow "punishing" Mr. Lar-
son for enlisting the aid of the Sweden courts. 
On the contrary, we are only holding Mr. Larson 
accountable for his actions. Even though Julia 
was no longer within the United States when Mr. 
Larson filed the petition in Sweden, the United 
States court retained jurisdiction to determine 
Julia's state of habitual residence. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(b). The United States district court had 
jurisdiction over the original petition as the court 
"in the place where the child is located at the 
time the petition is filed." Therefore, even 
though Julia was removed, the United States 
Court retained jurisdiction to determine the 
child's place of habitual residence. Additionally, 
the permissive language of the Convention's art. 
12 dismissal provision, which allows a court to 
stay or dismiss an action versus mandating a 
[17] As already noted, given the unique 
circumstances of this case, the district court 
should have considered the importance of a 
proper, uniform interpretation of the Con-
vention, along with a consideration of the 
Convention's purpose, when evaluating the 
merits of Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss. 
We now consider those factors. 
a. Proper Interpretation of the Hague 
Convention's Procedures 
When the district court considered wheth-
er Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia from 
Utah was wrongful, it misconstrued the Con-
vention's contemplated procedures. Accord-
ing to the Convention, once a petition is filed, 
a court should consider only whether a re-
dismissal once a child is removed, suggests the 
United States court retained jurisdiction even 
after Julia was removed from Utah. , 
Rather than relying on the original action, Mr. 
Larson initiated a second proceeding, which has 
resulted in a ruling contrary to his interests and 
which has resulted in two conflicting internation-
al decisions, a problem we must somehow ad-
dress. Certainly, we are not punishing him by 
subjecting him to the results of the proceeding 
he, in fact, initiated. Further, the fact Mr. Lar-
son attempted to limit the Sweden court's juris-
diction is of no moment. Once Mr. Larson filed 
the petition in the Sweden court, that court had 
proper jurisdiction to determine Julia's place of 
habitual residence regardless of the fact Mr. Lar-
son attempted to limit the Sweden court's review 
to the 1994 removal. Hague Convention, art. 3, 
51 Fed.Reg. at 10498. 
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spondevt's removals of a child are wrongful. 
See Hague Convention, arts. 3, 12, 51 Fed. 
Reg. at 10498, 10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b), 
(e). Here, antithetic to the Convention's in-
tent as a whole, the court considered whether 
the petitioner's removals of the child were 
wrongful. 
[18] When Ms. Ohlander petitioned the 
United States district court for Julia's return 
to Sweden, the issue before the court was 
whether Mr. Larson's removal of Julia from 
Sweden was wrongful pursuant to the Con-
vention. Hague Convention, art. 3, 51 Fed. 
Reg. at 10498. Once Ms. Ohlander removed 
Julia from Utah, the issue became whether 
Ms. Ohlander's removals were wrongful. 7c?. 
By filing his own petition in the Sweden 
courts, Mr. Larson chose to adjudicate Ms. 
Ohlander's removals of Julia in the foreign 
court rather than in the United States dis-
trict court. The district court's consideration 
of Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia without 
Mr. Larson having filed a cross-petition in 
that court was contrary to the Convention's 
intended procedures. 
Additionally, denial of Ms. Ohlander's mo-
tion to dismiss renders Ms. Ohlander's most 
relevant defense to Julia's return to Utah 
unavailable, namely, the "settled environ-
ment" defense. Hague Convention, art. 12, 
51 Fed.Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). Under the Convention's 
plain terms, one defense to a child's return is 
showing the petition was filed a year after 
the child's removal or retention and that the 
child has become settled in his or her new 
environment. Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 
Fed.Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). When Ms. Ohlander filed 
her petition, she was asking for Julia's return 
to Sweden; any defenses to Julia's return, 
under Article 12 or otherwise, were available 
only to the respondent, Mr. Larson. See 
Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 
8. The dissent takes issue with our interpretation 
of the availability of this defense to Ms. Ohlan-
der. Apparently, the dissent interprets the Con-
vention as restricting the Sweden court's review 
to Ms. Ohlander's 1994 removal of Julia and not 
to allow review of Ms. Ohlander's additional 
retentions and removals of Julia, particularly Ms. 
Ohlander's 1992 removal of Julia from Utah. We 
disagree with this inteipretation. The Conven-
10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). Conse-
quently, Ms. Ohlander could not, under the 
Convention's contemplated procedures, prop-
erly assert the "settled environment" de-
fense. However, once Mr. Larson filed his 
own petition in Sweden seeking to adjudicate 
Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia from Utah, 
Ms. Ohlander rightfully could assert the "set-
tled environment" defense. Hague Conven-
tion, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). Conversely, had Mr. Lar-
son filed a cross-petition in the United States 
district court for Julia's return to Utah, rath-
er than instigating an entirely new action in 
Sweden, Ms. Ohlander properly could have 
asserted her defenses in the United States 
district court. Since Mr. Larson chose to 
initiate a second Convention proceeding in 
Sweden, Sweden was the jurisdiction where 
the claims and defenses of both Ms. Ohlander 
and Mr. Larson could be more fairly adjudi-
cated. Therefore, the proper interpretation 
of the Convention weighs in favor of dismiss-
ing the United States action and allowing the 
issues to be decided in Sweden.8 
This result is further supported by the 
plain language of the Convention's art. 12, 
which states "where the judicial or adminis-
trative authority in the requested State has 
reason to believe the child has been taken to 
another State, it may stay the proceedings or 
dismiss the application for the return of the 
child." Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed. 
Reg. at 10499. While this language is per-
missive rather than mandatory, its words 
merit a court's consideration when denying a 
motion to dismiss. Congress has declared 
the importance of "the need for uniform in-
ternational interpretation of the Convention." 
42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B). Article 12 helps 
to ensure two disparate courts will not reach 
conflicting decisions by encouraging courts to 
dismiss or stay their actions where appropri-
ate. This case poses a perfect example of 
the need for Article 12's dismissal provision: 
tion is intended to provide finality to the parties, 
and it is our duty to see this intent carried out. 
We note this is an extremely difficult case, deal-
ing with the Convention's interpretation, an area 
singularly lacking in helpful precedent or con-
gressional guidance. It is merely our duty to 
resolve this case as best we can in accordance 
with our interpretation of the Convention and to 
give import to the intentions of that Convention. 
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the United States district court had knowl-
edge that Julia had been taken to Sweden, 
$jid that a second action initiated by Mr. 
Larson was pending in Sweden, where all the 
parties, including the child, were present. 
Therefore, we conclude the adherence to in-
tended Hague Convention procedures sup-
port Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss. 
b. Intent of the Hague Convention 
Failing to grant the motion to dismiss 
where a second duplicative action has been 
filed in a different country would potentially 
render the Hague Convention meaningless. 
Part of the Convention's intent is "to ensure 
that rights of custody and of access under 
the law of one Contracting State are effec-
tively respected in other Contracting States." 
Hague Convention, art. 1(b), 51 Fed.Reg. at 
10498. Prior to the Convention, when faced 
with an unfavorable custody decision, a par-
ent would flee to another country in search of 
a custody decision in his or her favor. This 
would often result in two conflicting custody 
decisions without guidance as to which coun-
try's custody decision had preference. The 
Hague Convention was drafted with the in-
tent to remove forever the incentive for a 
parent to flee across borders to obtain a 
favorable ruling. Letter of Transmittal from 
President Ronald Reagan (Oct. 30, 1985), 
reprinted in 51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10,495 
(1986); Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 
10505 (1986). Under the Convention, a child 
is to be expediently returned to his or her 
state of habitual residence "so that a court 
there can examine the merits of the custody 
dispute and award custody in the child's best 
interests." Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. at 
10505. As a result, the Convention was 
meant, in part, to lend priority to the custody 
determination hailing from the child's state 
of habitual residence. 
While the Convention proceedings in this 
case certainly have not achieved this intend-
ed result, a refusal to dismiss this action only 
exacerbates the problem. By failing to dis-
miss the United States action we would allow 
to stand two conflicting decisions regarding 
9. The dissent opines our reliance on this factor is 
ironic because the conflict between the two deci-
sions was merely "potential" at the time Mr. 
Larson filed the duplicative action in Sweden. It 
Julia's state of habitual residence, which 
could very well require a Hague Convention 
to determine which Hague Convention deter-
mination is valid. This, of course, is absurd. 
By dismissing this action, we instead require 
these and future litigants to choose which 
jurisdiction will determine a child's state of 
habitual residence, thereby salvaging what 
we can of the Convention's intended pur-
pose.9 
Failing to grant the motion to dismiss also 
could create a new incentive for parents to 
flee Hague Convention proceedings in the 
hope of obtaining a second, more favorable 
Convention determination in another coun-
try. We then would be left to solve the 
riddle of which competing ruling in each case 
is valid. This is a task we refuse to acquire. 
Rather, we believe the parties' interests 
would be best represented and judicial re-
sources best spent if parents engaged in this 
type international custody battle are re-
quired to resolve their dispute in one juris-
diction or the other. Holding Mr. Larson 
and future litigants to one jurisdiction gives 
import to the Convention's intended mean-
ing. 
c. Ms. Ohlander's Contempt 
[19-21] Certainly, the court's interest in 
ensuring a party's compliance with its orders 
is a great one, enforceable by fines or impris-
onment. Spallane v, United States, 493 U.S. 
265, 276, 110 S.Ct. 625, 632-33, 107 L.Ed.2d 
644 (1990). However, a court is obliged to 
use the "ieast possible power adequate to 
the end proposed.'" Id. at 276, 110 3.Ct. at 
632 (quoting United States v. Yonkers, 856 
F.2d 444, 454 (2d Cir.1988), and Anderson v. 
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)). 
Here, certainly other measures were avail-
able to compel compliance, such as personal 
sanctions against the mother, or possibly 
staying a decision pending the child's return. 
Under the provisions of the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act, the district 
court has the authority to implement mea-
is precisely the "potential" conflict between dif-
ferent countries' custody decisions that made the 
Convention necessary. 
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sures to "prevent the child's further removal 
or concealment before the final disposition of 
the petition." 42 U.S.C. § 11604. Given Ms. 
Ohlander's history of removing Julia from 
the United States, to prevent Ms. Ohlander 
from repeating this -behavior, perhaps the 
district court should have imposed more rigid 
measures, such as requiring Ms. Ohlander to 
surrender both her and Julia's passports to 
the clerk of court prior to receiving physical 
custody of Julia, or leaving custody with Mr. 
Larson pending the petition's outcome. See 
Currier v. Currier, 845 F.Supp. 916, 923 
(D.N.H.1994) (district court requiring peti-
tioner surrender her and her children's pass-
port to the court's clerk pending appeal). 
However, if such measures are not imposed, 
or if they fail, the court is not thereby re-
leased of its duty to consider the merits of 
the parties' cases when considering how best 
to enforce compliance. In sum, there is no 
doubt Ms. Ohlander's actions were contempt-
ible, for she brazenly thumbed her nose at 
the United States district court's order not to 
remove Julia from Utah; nevertheless, such 
conduct does not warrant a court denying a 
motion to dismiss solely on that ground. 
In sum, we hold it necessary to dismiss 
this action. Mr. Larson does not suffer legal 
prejudice from such a dismissal, and the 
balance of relevant factors, along with the 
intent of the Convention, weigh in favor of 
dismissal. 
, We REVERSE the district court and RE-
MAND with instructions to dismiss the peti-
tion without prejudice. 
MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I concur in the majority's conclusion that 
the district court erred in failing to consider 
the governing legal standards and relevant 
facts relating to Ms. Ohlander's Fed.R.Civ.P. 
41 motion to dismiss. Rather than resolve 
the Rule 41 issue ourselves, however, we 
should remand this case to the district court 
for an appropriate Rule 41 evaluation and an 
accompanying adequate development of the 
1. As discussed on pages 1534-35, the only other 
factor the majority articulates in favor of Ms. 
Ohlander's motion is its conclusory statement, 
lacking support in the record, that there was no 
excessive delay and lack of diligence on Ms. 
record in light of the new law established bf\ 
this court's opinion. Therefore, I dissent 
from the majority's resolution of the motiotf 
to dismiss on the merits and its failure'tcf 
remand. ';r<^ 
A. Rule 41(a)(2) Factors '• hoo 
The trial court denied Ms. Ohlander's f$A 
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss for the 
sole reason that Ms. Ohlander was hi con-
tempt of court. In doing so, the court faim 
to consider the appropriate legal standard 
under Rule 41(a)(2). Although the trial wujjj 
could properly consider Ms. Ohlander's cqij(j 
temptuous conduct, it was also required ^ 
evaluate other governing legal criteria 
McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cos. Co.,- 88R 
F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (noting trififc 
court errs when it fails to consider applicable 
legal standard or facts on which exercise toft 
discretionary judgment is based). Its fafltire* 
to do so requires reversal. ' Wtfflfl; 
Ironically, the majority has reversed .thjjf 
district court for refusing to grant Ms.<;Q)d| 
ander's motion for the sole reason that fenk 
was in contempt of court, yet ruled & 'nogjf 
that Ms. Ohlander's motion should be gnitiitg 
ed for the sole reason that Mr. Larson 
ated his own Hague Convention proi 
ings.1 The district court was required^ 
evaluate fairly all Rule 41 factors; we shi 
similarly be bound. An adequate rec6r<r< 
remand, however, would be necessary, 
In evaluating a Rule 41(a)(2) motion]^ 
dismiss, a court must consider the preju 
to the non-moving party. Clark v. Tan 
F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir.1993). In fM 
we adopted the following factors to"&8 
"legal prejudice" to the opposing partyi^] 
the non-moving party's effort and expenii$j 
preparation for trial; (2) the moving pa 
delay and lack of diligence in prosecuting! 
action; and (3) insufficient explanatidii^ 
the need to allow a dismissal. Clark, 13'H 
i'ffcli" 
Ohlander's part in bringing her motioi 
Stripped of this unsupported assertion, it i 
dent that the majority's outcome rests on 
the desire to avoid a potentially conflicting'! 
sion from another sovereign state. 
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at 1411. This list is not exhaustive; a court 
may also consider other relevant factors in 
its Rule 41(a)(2) analysis. Phillips USA 
Inc. v. Allflex USA Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 
(10th Cir.1996) (noting above factors are not 
exclusive, but instead are guides for district 
court). 
The record does not address Mr. Larson's 
effort and expense of preparation for trial. 
Ms. Ohlander did not file her motion to dis-
miss, however, until Mr. Larson had filed a 
request for a final pretrial conference, sug-
gesting that Mr. Larson had completed sub-
stantial trial preparation. If so, this would 
weigh against granting a motion to dismiss. 
As to the second Tansy factor, the majori-
ty states that "the record shows Ms. Ohlan-
der's counsel was actively and diligently mov-
ing forward with the case regardless of Ms. 
Ohlander's absence." Maj. Op. at 1538. A 
review of the docket sheet, the only record of 
Ms. Ohlander's litigation activity, undermines 
this assertion. The docket reveals that Ms. 
Ohlander waited almost a year after initiat-
ing her action before filing her motion to 
dismiss. During this time she did virtually 
nothing to affirmatively move her case along; 
instead, she merely responded through coun-
sel to Mr. Larson's efforts to obtain a con-
tempt order and the return of Julia to Utah. 
Thus, if anything, the limited record before 
us supports the conclusion that Ms. Ohlander 
did not diligently prosecute this action. In-
deed, her conduct in absconding with Julia in 
violation of the court order belies a motiva-
tion to move her case forward. A remand 
would be useful on this point to explore 
whether she or her counsel made any efforts 
to prosecute the case that do not now appear 
in the record. 
The majority also opines that because Ms. 
Ohlander filed her motion to dismiss after 
Mr. Larson filed his application with the 
United States Central Authority, "the timing 
rf Ms. Ohlander's motion could not constitute 
I. As noted on pages 1535-36, his filing in Swe-
den was also mandated by the United States 
enabling legislation for the Hague Convention, 
excessive delay sufficient to legally prejudice 
Mr. Larson." Maj. Op. at 1538. The logic of 
this statement is unclear. The filing of her 
motion in no way reflects her pre-filing dili-
gence in prosecuting her case once she re-
moved the child from the United States in 
violation of the district court's order. In-
deed, Mr. Larson's application with the Unit-
ed States Central Authority is absolutely ir-
relevant to an evaluation of whether Ms. 
Ohlander diligently pursued her separately 
filed action before the United States District 
Court. 
Finally, Ms. Ohlander did not provide a 
sufficient explanation of her need for dismiss-
al. Ms. Ohlander gave three reasons for her 
Rule 41 motion, all derived from her fleeing 
with the child in violation of the district 
court's order and her defiance of the district 
court's subsequent order that the child be 
returned to Utah. None of Ms. Ohlander's 
reasons warrant dismissal of her action. The 
majority forthrightly acknowledges that 
granting Ms. Ohlander's motion based on her 
first two reasons (that her petition was moot, 
and the child was no longer in the state of 
Utah) would create a perverse incentive for 
others to use United States courts to obtain 
physical control of their children and then 
unlawfully flee the United States. Thus, 
these reasons concededly provide no support 
for Ms. Ohlander's motion. 
The majority concludes that Ms. Ohlan-
der's third reason for dismissal, Mr. Larson's 
application to the Swedish Authority and his 
subsequent petition to the Swedish court, 
"provided the most persuasive reason to dis-
miss the United States district court pro-
ceeding." Maj. Op. at 1539. Punishing Mr. 
Larson for enlisting the aid of the only sover-
eignty with physical control of his child, how-
ever; ignores the practical and emotional di-
lemma with which Mr. Larson was faced. 
Litigating this matter in the United States 
could not provide Mr. Larson what he sought 
most: contact with his child. With his child 
in Sweden, albeit unlawfully, Mr. Larson had 
no real alternative but to seek Swedish assis-
tance.2 Otherwise, he was faced with the 
devastating potential of a lingering loss of 
contact with his daughter. In addition, Mr. 
the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 
which provides jurisdiction only to courts "in the 
1544 114 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
Larson had strategic litigation reasons for 
filing in Sweden when he did. The Hague 
Convention allows a parent who has fled even 
unlawfully with a child to assert a settled 
environment defense to a petition for return 
of a child if the petition is not filed within one 
year from the date the child is taken. Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction, Dec. 23, 1981, art. 12, 
51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10499 (1986). Mr. Lar-
son, therefore, had only one year to file if he 
wanted to prevent Ms. Ohlander from creat-
ing this defense by her unlawful flight. Un-
der these circumstances, Mr. Larson's filing 
in Sweden does not in any way compel the 
dismissal of the United States action. 
B. Additional Factors 
1. Appropriate Forum 
The majority maintains that Sweden was 
"the jurisdiction where the claims and de-
fenses of both Ms. Ohlander and Mr. Larson 
could be more fairly adjudicated." Maj. Op. 
at 1540. Specifically, the majority bases its 
preference for a Swedish adjudication on the 
presence of all the parties, including Julia, in 
Sweden, and its view that only in Sweden 
could Ms. Ohlander assert a "settled environ-
ment" defense. 
Placing weight on the presence of all par-
ties in the Swedish proceedings is inappropri-
ate. The precipitating reason for all parties' 
participation in the Swedish action was Ms. 
Ohlander's unlawful flight from the United 
States with Julia. Had Ms. Ohlander obeyed 
the district court's order and remained in 
Utah with Julia during the pendency of the 
United States proceedings, all parties would 
have been physically present for the United 
States proceedings. Instead, Ms. Ohlander 
chose to participate through counsel rather 
than to personally attend the United States 
trial. Her unlawful absence from the United 
States trial should not accrue to her benefit. 
The majority's view that the settled envi-
ronment defense is available only in Sweden 
is similarly flawed. Article 12 of the Hague 
Convention creates the settled environment 
defense only when "a period of less than one 
year has elapsed from the date of the wrong-
ful removal or retention." Hague Conven-
tion, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499. Because 
Mr. Larson filed in Sweden within one year 
of Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia, the de-
fense was unavailable to Ms. Ohlander in the 
Swedish action. Similarly, if Mr. Larson had 
complied with the majority's ruling and filed 
in the United States within one year of Ju-
lia's removal, the defense would have been 
unavailable in the United States action. 
Furthermore, the majority erroneously as-
serts that denying Ms. Ohlander's motion to 
dismiss renders the settled environment de-
fense unavailable to her in the Utah action. 
The availability of the settled environment 
defense hinges on the filing and timing of 
Mr. Larson's own petition, not on whether 
Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss is granted 
or denied. 
2. Hague Convention Procedures 
The majority also states that Mr. Larson 
"chose to assert his claims in a court of 
another jurisdiction," Maj. Op. at 1539 (em-
phasis added), and that he would have been 
better served by filing a cross-petition in the 
United States District Court. Mr. Larson 
did not, however, have a choice where to file 
his petition once Ms. Ohlander took Julia to 
Sweden. Section 11603(b) of the Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act, the 
enabling legislation for the Hague Conven-
tion, provides: 
Any person seeking to initiate judicial pro-
ceedings under the Convention for the re-
turn of a child or for arrangements for 
organizing or securing the effective exer-
cise of rights of access to a child may do so 
by commencing a civil action by filing a 
petition for the relief sought in any court 
which has jurisdiction of such action and 
which is authorized to exercise its jurisdic-
tion in the place where the child is located 
at the time the petition is filed. 
42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (emphasis added). At 
the time Mr. Larson filed his petition in 
January 1995, Julia was in Sweden, not Utah. 
At that point in time, the enabling legislation 
place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed." 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b). 
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for the Hague Convention itself compelled 
Mr. Larson to file in Sweden because of 
Julia's presence there; it was the only nation 
with jurisdiction. 
Mr. Larson was careful to limit his Swed-
ish petition to the issue of Ms. Ohlander's 
taking of Julia in February 1994. The peti-
tion specifically informed the Swedish court 
of the Hague Convention proceedings pend-
ing in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, and that Mr. Larson 
was not intending to confer jurisdiction on 
the Swedish courts over the Hague Conven-
tion matters that were properly before the 
United States District Court. Mr. Larson 
also requested that the Swedish courts await 
the district court's ruling on those matters. 
After the United States District Court en-
tered its findings and conclusions, the United 
States Central Authority notified Sweden of 
the United States ruling and asked that the 
Swedish court limit its decision to the issue 
presented in Mr. Larson's petition. In a 
memo to Sweden's Central Authority, a rep-
resentative of the Office of Children's Issues 
stated: 
The only unresolved Hague Convention is-
sue for the Swedish courts to rule upon is 
the final resolution of Ms. Ohlander's most 
recent removal of the child from Utah on 
February 1, 1994. There is no doubt that 
Sweden is the "requested State" for the 
adjudication of that issue, and that the 
Swedish courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
to make a final resolution of that matter in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
Hague Convention. Regarding that re-
moval, the U.S. Court, as a judicial author-
ity of the "requesting State," has made 
findings in accordance with Article 15 of 
the Convention, namely that the removal 
was in breach of Mr. Larson's actually-
exercised rights of custody under Utah 
law, and that Mr. Larson neither consent-
3. Before the Sweden Supreme Administrative 
Court created the international conflict in deci-
sions, the United States Central Authority en-
treated the Swedish courts: 
It is only through [ ] cooperation that the 
Hague Convention can successfully resolve 
these international conflicts over children, as it 
was designed to do. The present case offers a 
perfect illustration: A Hague Convention judg-
ment from Sweden which respects the prior 
ed to nor acquiesced in the removal. 
These findings, coupled with the judicially 
established fact that the child was habitu-
ally resident in Utah in November 1993, 
where she continued to live until the date 
of said removal, clearly establish that this 
was a new wrongful removal within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. 
Memorandum from Mr. James L. Schuler, 
Office of Children's Issues, United States 
Central Authority, to Central Authority of 
Sweden 2 (August 14,1995). 
The Hague Convention procedures thus 
not only required Mr. Larson to file in Swe-
den, where the child was located, but also 
allowed him to limit his petition to the one 
issue not before the United States District 
Court. By following Hague Convention pro-
cedures and limiting his Swedish petition, he 
did not voluntarily create the potential for 
conflicting international decisions. 
3. Conflicting Decisions 
The majority's desire to avoid conflicting 
decisions of sovereign states is a worthy goal. 
Nevertheless, no law, national or internation-
al, can be expected to resolve such conflicts 
in all cases, particularly cases involving a 
mother and father warring over their off-
spring. To base the outcome of this case on 
a potentially conflicting decision of Sweden is 
to unjustifiably abandon the rights of a Unit-
ed States citizen in the name of international 
comity. It is indeed ironic to do §o when the 
substantive decision of the district court was 
not in conflict with any extant Swedish deci-
sion at the time of its promulgation. To the 
contrary, the Swedish decision favorable to 
Ms. Ohlander created the conflict in the deci-
sions of two sovereign nations. The Swedish 
decision was issued after and in conflict with 
the district court decision.3 See United 
States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 
169-70 (3d Cir.1997) ("As a condition to hon-
oring a foreign country's judicial decrees, the 
Hague Convention judgment from the U.S. will 
put an end to the international jurisdictional 
competition between these States and will al-
low for a final and long-overdue custody adju-
dication, thus providing for the best interests 
of the child and finally allowing her to develop 
stable, secure family relationships, On the 
other hand, a Hague Convention judgment 
from Sweden which disregards the prior 
Hague Convention judgment from the United 
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Court also requires reciprocity on the part of 
the foreign nation."); Remington Rand 
Corp.-DeL v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 
1260, 1273 (3d Cir.1987) (noting comity must 
be "two-way street" anil reciprocity is consid-
eration of "extreme importance"). 
Because no Hague Convention decisions 
had been rendered by any Swedish courts at 
the time the district court ruled on the mo-
tion to dismiss, it is furthermore inappropri-
ate for this court to base its ruling on the 
conflict in decisions. See Maj. Op. at 1541 
("By failing to dismiss, the United States 
action we would allow to stand two conflict-
ing decisions regarding Julia's state of habit-
ual residence "). Instead, our review 
should be limited to those factors before the 
district court at the time it ruled. New 
factual matters should only be considered by 
the district court in the exercise of its discre-
tion on remand. 
4. Consideration of Ms. Ohlahder's Con-
tempt 
The district court's consideration of Ms. 
Ohlander's contempt of court was entirely 
appropriate. Although the district court con-
sidered this to the exclusion of other relevant 
criteria, its actions in doing so are under-
standable, if not correct. Ms. Ohlander 
availed herself of the services of the district 
court to obtain temporary custody of the 
child.' She then fled this country in direct 
States would only perpetuate and escalate the 
already intolerable conflict, as the parties 
would then possess contradictory Hague Con-
vention judgments in their favor from their 
respective States, which would be the most 
unstable and insecure situation imaginable. 
Such a situation would guarantee that which-
ever parent has possession of the child would 
not dare allow the other parent access to the 
child, and the parent without possession of the 
child would have no option but to resort to 
force in order to have dny contact with the 
child. 
Memo from Mr. James L Schuler, Office of 
Children's Issues, to Central Authority of Sweden 
'2-3 (August 14, 1995). 
4. Rule 41(a)(2) provides: "If a counterclaim has 
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service 
upon the defendant of the plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against 
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim 
can remain pending for independent adjudica-
tion by the court." Fed.RXiv P. 41(a)(2). 
violation of the very order by which she 
obtained physical control of the child. Her 
conduct can neither be ignored nor reward-
ed. Although this should not control the 
district court's decision to the exclusion of 
other governing factors, it may fairly be giv-
en significant weight in the court's overall 
analysis. 
C. Treatment of Larson's Defenses as 
Counterclaims 
The majority rejects Mr. Larson's request 
that his response to Ms. Ohlander's petition 
be treated as a counterclaim or, for Hague 
Convention purposes, a petition.4 Maj. Op. 
at 1538-39. Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure allows a court to treat a 
defense as a counterclaim, "if justice so re-
quires." In Mr. Larson's response to Ms 
Ohlander's petition, he alleges that the Unit-
ed States was, and at all times had been, the 
country of Julia's habitual residence as de-
fined under the Hague Convention, and 
prays for his daughter's return to his physi-
cal care and control. The essence of Mr. 
Larson's response is generally equivalent to 
the relief he would request were he to file his 
own formal Hague Convention petition.5 
Treating Mr. Larson's response as a counter-
claim would place the respondent's removal 
of the child and any proper settled environ-
ment defense before the district court, thus 
eradicating the majority's concern that such 
issues could not be decided without Mr. Lar-
5. For example, Ms Ohlander's petition before 
the district court requested the following relief: 
Petitioner requests that the child be immedi-
ately returned to her custody, and that she be 
permitted to return to Sweden, which is the 
country of habitual residence of both Petitioner 
and the child, and that temporarily, pending 
further hearing on this Petition, she be permit-
ted to retain custody of the child within the 
jurisdiction of this Court pending this Court's 
final determination 
Petition for Return of Child to Petitioner at 4: 
Mr. Larson alleged substantially the same mat-
ters in his defenses. Justice would not be served 
by requiring Mr Larson to file a separate plead-
ing, formally designated as a counterclaim, alleg-
ing the very matters already contained in his 
defenses. To do so honors form over substance 
in an emotionally charged setting where a parent 
seeks to reestablish contact with his child. 
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son's own petition in the district court. See 
Hague Convention, arts. 3 & 12, 51 Fed.Reg. 
at 10,498-10,499; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b), (e). 
In light of Rule 41(a)(2) factors and the 
Hague Convention's objective of protecting 
children from the law of "grab and run," 
(Maj. Op. at 1534-35), the interests of justice 
are indeed served by construing Mr. Lar-
son's response as a counterclaim. 
D. Conclusion 
The majority has reversed the district 
court for refusing to dismiss Ms. Ohlander's 
petition on the basis of her contempt of court 
and instead has ruled de novo that Ms. Ohl-
ander's motion should have been granted. 
In doing so, the majority has considered 
facts not before the district court at the time 
it ruled. It has further allowed those very 
facts (ie.f conflicting international decisions) 
to control the outcome of this appeal, to the 
exclusion of other governing criteria. 
This case should be remanded to the dis-
trict court for full consideration of Rule 
41(a)(2) criteria.6 The trial court failed to 
consider critical factors governing Ms. Ohlan-
der's motion. Consequently, the record of 
such factors is incomplete. An appellate 
court may decide a matter rather than re-
mand if the underlying facts are undisputed 
and judicial economy and efficiency would be 
furthered thereby. Park County Resource 
Council, Inc. v. United States Dept ofAgric, 
817 F.2d 609, 617-18 (10th Cir.1987), over-
ruled on other grounds by Village of Los 
Ranches de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 
970, 973 (10th Cir.1992). Such is not the 
case here. A remand is required when the 
record needs further development. See 
Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 341 (10th 
Cir.1994) (remanding when record inade-
quate to evaluate trial court's consideration 
of required criteria). 
In this case, the record is simply insuffi-
cient to enable this court to apply adequately 
the legal criteria governing Rule 41(a)(2) mo-
tions to dismiss. In addition, the majority 
6. It is incongruous for this court to say that Rule 
41 motions are addressed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court and yet, rather than remand, 
rule de novo that trial court discretion as a mat-
ter of law could only result in dismissal. Beyond 
this incongruity, ruling de novo that Ms. Ohlan-
der's Rule 41 motion should be granted as a 
has set forth a set of novel factors it believes 
must be evaluated in this case. The trial 
court had absolutely no notice that consider-
ation of such factors would be required in 
this case. If the majority is going to require 
a trial court to consider novel factors, that 
court should be given an opportunity to exer-
cise its discretion, address those factors on 
remand and develop a meaningful record. 
At that time, the district court cpuld carefully 
consider the mandate of the Convention's 
Article 12 which provides that a forum may 
stay or dismiss a Hague Convention pro-
ceeding when the subject child has been tak-
en to another State. Hague Convention, art. 
12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10,499. 
In the context of this case, an appellate 
ruling as a matter of law is inappropriate. I 
would reverse and remand for further pro-
ceedings on Ms. Ohlander's Rule 41 motion 
to dismiss. 
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